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ERIC A. POSNERt & ADRIAN VERMEULE
tt
Constitutional  law and politics is full of (what the headlines  call)
"showdowns"  between  and among  branches  of government.1  When
the Democratic  Congress began  investigating  the dismissal of United
States Attorneys,  congressional  committees  issued  subpoenas and  the
White  House  asserted  executive  privilege  to  block  advisers  to  the
President from being forced to  testify.2  This is a familiar Washington
pattern,  which  usually ends  in a bargained  compromise  between  the
legislative and executive branches, but occasionally ends up in a large-
scale  showdown.  In  the  latter case,  the result  may  be  litigation  that
creates  a judicial precedent,  a political settlement that creates a non-
judicial precedent, or both.
Showdowns occur between  the President and the courts, between
Congress  and the  courts,  as  well  as  between  the  President and  Con-
gress.  Indeed, some showdowns  involve all  three branches  simultane-
ously,  or  threaten  to do  so.  When  congressional  committees  issue
subpoenas and  the executive  asserts  privilege,  the courts may eventu-
ally be asked  to enforce  the subpoenas.  When Franklin  Roosevelt at-
f  Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
** Professor of Law,  Harvard  Law School.  Thanks to David Abrams, Jacob Gersen,
Todd Henderson, Daryl  Levinson, Adam Samaha, Matthew Stephenson, Cass Sunstein,
Jonathan  Wiener, John  Yoo, workshop  participants  at the  University  of Chicago  Law
School, and participants at a Harvard Conference on Constitutions and Consequences,
for helpful  comments, and to Jennifer Shkabatur  and Elisabeth Theodore  for helpful
research assistance.
I See,  e.g., Edward Epstein, Dems Seek Showdown on War; House, Senate Leaders 7  Push
Legislation That Would Force Bush To  Withdraw Troops, S.F. CHRON.,  Mar.  9,  2007,  at Al
(describing proposals  by congressional  Democrats  that would mandate troops leaving
Iraq  against  President Bush's  opposition  to  such  measures);  Maura  Reynolds,  Senate
Vote Nears on Guantanamo  Detainee  Rights; Showdown Is Set  Today on a Measure That Would
Bar  Prisoners'Access to Federal Court, L.A. TIMES,  Nov. 15,  2005, at A14  (detailing legisla-
tive  action  to  overturn  a  Supreme  Court decision);  Reynolds  Holding,  The Executive
Privilege Showdown,  TIME.COM,  Mar.  21,  2007,  http://www.time.com/time/nation/
article/0,8599,1601450,00.html  (describing  the  right  the  executive  branch  claims  it
has "to withhold certain  information  from Congress").
2  See Sheryl  Gay  Stolberg, Bush  Moves  Toward Showdown  with Congress on Executive
Privilege, N.Y.  TIMES, June  29,  2007,  at A23  (explaining  the  clash  between  President
Bush's assertion of his "right to  unfettered and candid advice  from  his top aides" and
the "Congressional  right to conduct oversight").
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tempted to pack the Supreme Court, the attempt implicated  congres-
sional  as well  as judicial  prerogatives, because  a bill  was  necessary  to
expand the  number of seats on the Court.  Some legislators  opposed
the bill even though  (they claimed)  they would have favored  a consti-
tutional amendment.
3
The  idea of a constitutional  showdown  seems, at  first, hopelessly
vague.  But informal  talk of showdowns  is  extremely  widespread and
persistent  in both scholarship  and in the  popular press, and  there  is
undoubted pretheoreical appeal to the category, which  seems to cap-
ture one major  mechanism  of constitutional development.  Our pro-
ject here is to put some theoretical backbone into the idea of a consti-
tutional  showdown.4  We  attempt  to  give  a usable  definition  of the
idea,  analyze  the  circumstances  under  which  showdowns  will  or will
not occur, and offer some  normative  observations  about whether the
American  constitutional  system tends to produce  too many or too few
3  See Adrian  Vermeule,  Political Constraints on  Supreme Court Reform, 90  MINN.  L.
REv.  1154, 1170  (2006).
4  The  closest analogue  in the literature  is the  useful idea of "constitutional hard-
ball."  See  Mark  Tushnet,  Constitutional Hardball, 37 J.  MARSHALL  L.  REv.  523,  523
(2004)  (defining "constitutional hardball" as "political claims and practices-legislative
and executive  initiatives-that  are without  much question within  the bounds of exist-
ing constitutional doctrine and practice but that are nonetheless  in some tension with
existing pre-constitutional  understandings").  Although Tushnet uses some of the  same
examples we  will discuss, Tushnet specifies  his idea by reference  to preexisting consti-
tutional understandings, while we specify ours by reference  to the downstream  prece-
dent-setting effects of showdowns.  See infra Part I.B.  Moreover, Tushnet embeds "con-
stitutional  hardball"  in  a  jurisprudential  framework  structured  around  Bruce
Ackerman's  theory  of constitutional  transformation,  whereas  we  use  a standard  wel-
fare-economic framework.  As for Ackerman, his idea of a "constitutional moment" is a
subset of constitutional  showdowns; many episodes that count as showdowns under our
definition  are  not constitutional  moments  in Ackerman's  sense.  See I  BRUCE  ACKER-
MAN, WE THE PEOPLE  22  (1991)  (describing "concrete historical processes that allowed
Americans  to transform  moments of passionate sacrifice and excited mobilization into
lasting legal achievements").  Jack  Balkin  and Sanford  Levinson  distinguish  between
constitutional  crises  in which  actors concede  they are  violating the Constitution  (usu-
ally, they claim,  in order to  save  the Constitution),  and crises in which actors  claim  to
be  acting  within  the  boundaries  of the  Constitution.  See Sanford  Levinson  & Jack
Balkin,  Three Types  of Constitutional  Crisis  (2007)  (unpublished  manuscript, on file
with  authors).  This  is a legal  distinction  orthogonal  to our  concept of a showdown,
which  might fall into either category.  (We omit Balkin and Levinson's third category,
which  is not relevant here.)  Finally, there  is also a related  private-law literature on liti-
gation  and settlement.  See,  e.g.,  William  M.  Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication
as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.  235  (1979)  (discussing incentives  of individuals to
resolve disputes in a socially optimal way); Steven  Shavell, The Level of  Litigation: Private
Versus Social Optimality of Suit and Settlement,  19  INT'L REv.  L. & ECON.  99  (1999)  (com-
paring the socially optimal level of litigation to privately determined levels of litigation).
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showdowns, and whether the showdowns  it does produce occur under
socially optimal circumstances.
Part I  defines showdowns both conceptually  and by example and
organizes our succeeding claims.  Part II examines the social costs and
benefits  of showdowns.  The  main benefit  is  that showdowns  clarify
the constitutional  allocation of powers, reducing transaction  costs and
uncertainty  in later periods  or generations.  The  main costs are  that
showdowns  can  produce  needless  conflict  and  erroneous  or  prema-
ture  resolution  of  constitutional  issues  in  the  current  period, given
that  circumstances  and  constitutional  controversies  are  constantly
changing over time.
Part III  argues  that the  observed  rate  and  distribution  of show-
downs will in  all likelihood  diverge  from the socially optimal  rate and
distribution of showdowns.  The branches of government and the offi-
cials who staff them will produce showdowns when the private benefits
exceed  the private costs, not when the social benefits exceed the social
costs.  Although it is not clear,  in theory, whether  showdowns  will be
too many or too  few, we  suggest some institutional  reasons for think-
ing  that  the  American  constitutional  order  produces  too  few  show-
downs  and  too  much  uncertainty  about  the  allocation  of constitu-
tional powers.
In Part  IV,  we  elicit  the  main normative  implication:  where  the
social  benefits  of clarifying  the  constitutional  allocation  of authority
for future generations  are large, and  the countervailing  costs  of con-
stitutional  conflict  and  erroneous  or  premature  resolution  of issues
are low, institutions should  be encouraged  to practice  the active virtues
as opposed to the passive virtues.'  Rather  than ducking constitutional
conflicts,  they should  be encouraged-through  incentive-based  insti-
tutional  design, public  suasion,  or other means-to  engage  in more
constitutional  showdowns than  they would  otherwise  choose.  A brief
conclusion follows.
I.  PRELIMINARIES
We  will  define  constitutional  showdowns  both  extensionally,  by
examples  and  paradigm  cases  (in  Section  A),  and  intensionally,  by
necessary  and  sufficient criteria  (in  Sections  B  and  C).  The  former
See ALEXANDER  M. BICKEL,  THE LEAST DANGEROUS  BRANCH  111-99  (2d ed.  1986)
(describing  "the  passive  virtues"  that  counsel  the  Supreme  Court  against  deciding
some constitutional questions on the merits).
2008]994  UNIVERSITY OF  PENNSYL VANIA  LA W REVIEW
procedure  is  appropriate  for  family-resemblance  complexes,  where
there are many related ideas that share no single common property or
defining feature;  the idea of a constitutional  showdown  doubtless has
a family-resemblance  structure  of this sort.  Nonetheless  we  think it
will be useful  to the reader  to attempt a conceptual definition  as well,
if only to indicate more clearly where our theoretical concerns lie.
A.  Examples
To motivate  the later discussion,  and to indicate the sorts of cases
we have  in mind, consider the following examples of the three major
categories  of showdowns we will discuss.
1.  Presidential-Congressional  Showdowns
Impeachments  are  the  most  dramatic  constitutional  showdowns,
and inevitably create precedents.  AndrewJohnson's  impeachment for
violating the Tenure of Office Act, which forbade presidential removal
of  certain  cabinet  officers  without  congressional  approval,  was  de-
feated  by a single vote;  the Supreme  Court later cited this episode  to
support a conclusive  constitutional  rule in favor  of presidential power
to  remove  executive  officers,6  or at least "purely" executive  officers.7
The Nixon impeachment had a double precedential  effect, both cre-
ating  legal  forms  that were  used  in  the  Clinton  impeachment,  and
provoking  a constitutional  showdown  between  Nixon  and  the Court
8 that itself created ajudicial precedent on executive  privilege.
Struggles  over  appointments  and  executive  privilege  can,  of
course,  result  in  constitutional  showdowns  even  where  no  impeach-
ment eventuates.  A pure example  of a constitutional  showdown  oc-
curred when
[o]ne  year  into  President  [George  H.W.]  Bush's  term,  Congress
passed...  a provision prohibiting  the United States  from spending  any
money authorized  for international  conferences  on  the  U.S.  delegation
to the  Conference  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in Europe  unless  that
delegation  included  representatives  of the Commission  on  Security and
6  Myers  v. United States,  272 U.S.  52,  176-77  (1926)  (holding unconstitutional  a
law denying the President unrestricted power to remove the postmaster).
7 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626-28  (1935)  (limiting the
Myers decision such that the power of removal did not apply to members of the Federal
Trade Commission, a body with legislative and judicial duties).
8 See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal,  Executive Privileges and Immu-
nities:  The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARV.  L. REV. 701  (1995).
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Cooperation  in Europe.  This Commission  was composed almost entirely
of members appointed by the legislative branch.
Given  the  far-reaching  challenge  to powers  of the presidency,  Presi-
dent  Bush's  response  was  extremely  forceful.  He  announced  that  the
provision  was  unconstitutional,  and  that  he  would  refuse  to  enforce
it ....
...  [W]hile  the House of Representatives'  lawyer bitterly complained
about the  President's  refusal  to  enforce  the  law,  members  of Congress
took no further action.)
2.  Presidential-Judicial  Showdowns
Here  too  some  cases  result in  a judicial precedent  and some  do
not.  In  the  latter situation, consider  Lincoln's decision  to  defy  a ha-
beas corpus order issued by ChiefJustice Taney (in Ex parte Menyman)
during the opening days of the war.'0  This counts  as a showdown  be-
cause Lincoln's  action  was based on a particular  view of presidential
power to defy the courts in situations of extreme crisis, where doing so
is  necessary  to save "all the laws, but one";"  because  the judges acqui-
esced  through  inaction,  and through  extreme  deference  to  Lincoln
until the end of the Civil War;  and because Lincoln's action created a
(nonjudicial)  constitutional precedent that clarified  the constitutional
lines  of authority  and is  cited  to  this day  by  constitutional  theorists
with various views of presidential  power, judicial power,  and  the role
of emergencies in constitutional  law. 12
The former  situation is  exemplified  by some of the most famous
cases  in constitutional  law, such  as the  Steel  Seizure  case,  Youngstown
Sheet &  Tube Co. v.  Sauyer,'3 and the Watergate tapes case,  United States
v. Nixon.'4  In the former, the Court rejected a claim by President Tru-
man that he had constitutional  power to seize steel plants to prevent a
9 John  0.  McGinnis,  Constitutional  Review  by  the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War
Powers:  A  Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, LAW  & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn  1993, at 293, 309-11.
10  ExparteMerryman,  17 F. Cas.  144  (C.C.D. Md.  1861)  (No.  9487).
1 Abraham  Lincoln,  Message  to Congress  in Special  Session  (July 4,  1861),  in 4
THE  COLLECTED  WORKS  OF ABRAHAM  LINCOLN  421,  at 430  (Roy  P.  Basler  ed.,  1953)
(emphasis omitted).
12 In  addition,  consider  Andrew Jackson's  refusal  to  comply  with  the  Supreme
Court's  decision  in  Worcester v.  Georgia, 31  U.S.  515  (1832),  which  held  that Georgia
laws  had no force in Indian territory.
13 343 U.S.  579 (1952).
14  418 U.S.  683 (1974).
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work  stoppage  that  would  have  cut  off war  material  for American
forces  in  Korea;15  in  the  latter,  the  Court  rejected  a  "generalized"
claim of executive privilege and forced Nixon to turn over Oval Office
recordings  that had been lawfully subpoenaed  in  a grand jury investi- •  16
gation.  In both  cases,  the  President,  unlike  Lincoln,  promptly  ac-
quiesced  by  obeying  the  Court's  orders,  and  the  cases  have  set  the
terms of various separation of powers controversies  to the present day.
3.  Congressional-Judicial  Showdowns
A  central  storyline  of  American  constitutional  history  involves
showdowns  between  Congress  and  the  judiciary."  As  usual,  such
showdowns  have  created  precedents  even  when  no judicial  decision
ensued.  During  Reconstruction,  the  Republican  Congress  manipu-
lated the number ofJustices  in order to deny Democrat Andrew John-
son appointments to the Court, first lowering the number of seats and
then  raising  the  number  when  Ulysses  S.  Grant  came  into  office. 8
Congress's actions during this period were a prominent precedent for
Franklin Roosevelt's  Court-packing plan;  the failure of that plan itself
set a precedent that weighs against future manipulation of the Court's
membership.
Other actions  of the Reconstruction  Congress did result in judicial
precedents.  One was to enact legislation that deprived the Court ofju-
risdiction to hear a pending case, thus preventing the Court-were  the
legislation  upheld-from  limiting congressional  power  to deploy mili-
tary commissions  in the  former Confederacy.  Bowing to  the  political
winds,  the  Court  upheld  the jurisdiction-stripping  statute  in  Ex  parte
McCarde.19  The decision has served as an important precedent in many
later episodes  and cases; although  its authority has been  questioned by
commentators,
2
0  and the Court has  in later episodes  typically used  ag-
gressive  statutory  construction  to find jurisdiction  while  avoiding  the
15 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589.
16  Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713.
17  See generally  CHARLES  GARDNER  GEYH,  WHEN  COURTS  & CONGRESS  COLLIDE:
THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF  AMERICA'SJUDICIAL SYSTEM  (2006).
18  Id. at 66-67.
19  74 U.S. (7 Wall.)  506, 515  (1868).
20 Barry Friedman,  The History of the Countermajoritarian  Difficulty, Part II:  Recon-
struction's  Political Court, 91  GEO.  L.J.  1, 36  (2002)  ("Given  the odor of politics  [at the
time of the Court's  decision],  it is  somewhat surprising that the  Court's dismissal  of
McCardle frequently has been invoked as support for the proposition that Congress has
broad power to remove cases from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.").
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constitutional  questions, this sort of controversial  posthistory is the fate
of many prominent precedents, both judicial and nonjudicial.
B.  Definitions
We  will  say that a constitutional  showdown  is  (1)  a disagreement
between  branches of government  over their constitutional  powers that
(2)  ends  in  the  total  or partial  acquiescence  by  one  branch  in  the
views  of the  other and  that  (3)  creates  a constitutional  precedent.2'
Constitutional  showdowns  are  a subset  of legal showdowns  generally;
the  latter would  include,  for example,  a disagreement  between  the
President and the courts over whether the President has been granted
particular powers by statute, rather than by constitutional  law.
Our definition embodies  several assumptions.  First, we will often
speak  of "institutional interests"  or  the  interests of branches  of gov-
ernment;  these formulations  are just shorthand  for  the point that in-
dividuals are in some cases motivated  to promote the interests of insti-
tutions  to which  they belong, although  in  other cases  they are not.
22
We  relax  this simplifying assumption  in  later discussion,  but for  now
we  will  use  personified  branches-the  President,  Congress,  and  the
courts.  The justification  for this assumption  is twofold:  it simplifies
the  presentation  of our claims  without  serious  loss  of accuracy,  and
each  branch  contains internal  rules  for aggregating  individual votes
21 Peter Spiro  offers  an  illuminating  treatment of  the  way  in  which  war  powers
controversies acquire precedential force.
[T]he  legal  significance  of any such  episode  will  hinge  on three  elements.
First, it is actions that count, not words;  mere assertions of executive or legisla-
tive  authority are  largely  irrelevant in  the long run,  the chaff of institutional
bravado.  Second,  in  order to  take  on  lawmaking  significance,  the  conduct
must be known  to  the other branch; secret operations  will  have  no  constitu-
tional  significance  until they are  made  known  to Congress  and it has had an
opportunity  to respond.  Third, the  other branch  must have  accepted  or ac-
quiesced  in the action.  Any conduct that satisfies (or even  arguably  satisfies)
these requirements  will become part of the precedential  mix; a single  histori-
cal episode can create incremental  elements of custom in  the same way that a
singlejudicial decision will incrementally change court-made doctrine.
Peter J.  Spiro,  War Powers and the Sirens of Formalism, 68  N.Y.U.  L.  REV.  1338,  1356
(1993)  (book review)  (footnotes omitted).  Our definition draws  on Spiro's but gener-
alizes it to a broader range of constitutional settings.
22  See DarylJ. Levinson, Empire-Building  Government in Constitutional  Law, 118 HARV.
L. REv. 915, 955  (2005)  ( "When legislators do find it politically advantageous to take a
position,  ....  that  position  is  mostly determined  not  by  the  institutional  interest  of
Congress  but by  the views  of their  constituents  (and,  difficult  to  disaggregate,  their
own personal policy preferences).").
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into  institutional  decisions,  such  as  statutes, judicial  precedents, and
executive  orders.23  Likewise, we  also bracket the role of political par-
ties in  a separation  of powers  system,  and take  up that issue  in later
discussion as well.
Second,  we  assume  that  constitutional  showdowns  create  prece-
dents, either judicial  or nonjudicial,  and  that these  precedents  have
some  positive  force  in  decision  making  during  later  periods.  Of
course, showdowns  are neither necessary nor sufficient to create  con-
stitutional precedents, but they have a probabilistic  tendency to do so,
which  is sufficient to motivate  our assumption.  Subsequently, we  dis-
cuss  alternative  mechanisms  of interstitial or small-scale  change  that
also create constitutional precedents.
When  showdowns  create  precedents,  the force  of such precedents
may be  large  or small, depending  on circumstances and context.  De-
spite  skepticism about the force of both judicial and nonjudicial  prece-
dents, our assumption is minimal.  Nonjudicial precedents, like judicial
ones,  are rarely  the only consideration  that later decision  makers  take
into account and are often overridden or ignored because preferences
or political  circumstances  have  changed;  but this  does  not mean  the
precedents never existed in the first place.  "Individual episodes will,  of
course,  have more  or less weight  in the  same way that  decisions from
some courts are  more meaningful  than from others, and in this respect
such factors  as frequency, consistency,  and regularity  will be important
to determining the constitutional probity of a particular practice."24
Note  that what starts off as  a  showdown  might end  as a compro-
mise,  with  the  disagreement papered  over  and neither side acquiesc-
ing  at all  in  the  other side's  claim  to authority.  Or  the  underlying
source of dispute might resolve itself before a true impasse is reached.
We will, by definitional fiat, decline  to call these situations showdowns,
albeit with the proviso that the line between a showdown  and ordinary
mechanisms  of constitutional development is a fine one.
23 See McGinnis,  supra note 9, at 295.  Actually,  there are  two slightly distinct issues
here.  First, even where a branch is staffed by a single individual, such  as the President,
there  may be a  divergence  between  "the interest  of the man" and  the "rights  of the
place."  See THE  FEDERALIST  NO.  51,  at 322  (James Madison)  (Clinton  Rossiter ed.,
1961).  Second,  the branches  are  staffed  by  multiple  actors  and  thus  face  internal
problems of aggregation.  This is obvious  for Congress and  the judiciary; it is also true
in practice of the executive  branch, which  includes not only the  President but a welter
of cabinet  officers,  agencies,  and other entities.  For now, we bracket both problems
and  assume  that  all  branches  act  like  unitary  individuals  who  rationally  pursue  the
branch's objective interests.
24  Spiro, supra  note 21,  at 1356.
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Several  mechanisms  can  cause  the  settlements  that occur  in ear-
lier episodes to have positive force  in later times.  The "civilizing force
of hypocrisy" 2 5  makes it positively costly for decision makers to disavow
a principle  they relied on  to their benefit at an earlier time, although
in some  cases  the  benefits  of opportunistic  disavowals  of precedent
are worth the cost. Precedents  may create focal points that coordinate
behavior;26  indeed,  focal  points  can  affect behavior  even  in interac-
27 tions  that mix cooperative  and distributive  motives  -circumstances
where all branches involved want to coordinate, yet the branches  have
different  preferences  about  which  rule  or  practice  to  coordinate
upon.  Precedents reduce  the costs of decision making, so that in later
periods  decision makers may follow them even  if they would have pre-
ferred  a different rule if deciding on a blank  slate; more  nebulously,
precedents  set in an earlier showdown  tend to ossify into institutional
routines  and individual habits, and may even become  internalized  by
actors who develop a sense of legal obligation  to follow the precedent.
We return to this last possibility shortly.
Third,  the  constitutional  "precedent"  that  is  created  by  a show-
down  may, but need  not, be a judicial precedent.  It  may also be  an •  28
unwritten  constitutional  norm  or  convention 2-a  practice  that  is
widely  understood  as  a  settlement  of a  constitutional  question  and
that  is  regular  or  stable  over  time,  although  it need  not be  eternal.
Constitutional  conventions  in  this  sense  include  the  refusal  of  any
president after Washington and before Franklin Roosevelt to stand for
a  third term,  a  convention  that eventually  collapsed,  and  the  norm
that the  President need  not submit treaties  to the  Senate during the
negotiating  phase, but need  only obtain  ex post  Senate  ratification.
The  latter  practice  was  also  established  by Washington  but has  per-
sisted to the present day.29
25  JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF  THE MIND  341, 402 (1999).
26  See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY  OF CONFLICT 67-68  (2d ed.  1980)  (ar-
guing that "[pirecedent seems  to exercise an influence  that greatly exceeds its logical
importance  or legal force"  and noting  that, in  the context of explicit bargaining, the
parties tend to reach settlements  that align with those previously determined  in similar
situations, as "often  it seems  that there is simply no heart left in the bargaining when it
takes place under the shadow of some dramatic and conspicuous precedent").
27  On  the  role of focal  points in  the  Battle of the  Sexes game, see JAMES  D. MOR-
ROW,  GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL  SCIENTISTS  94-97 (1994).
28  See Jon  Elster,  Unwritten  Constitutional  Norms  (2007)  (unpublished  manu-
script, on file with authors).
See  STANLEY ELKINS  & ERIC  McKITRICK,  THE AGE OF  FEDERALISM  55-58  (1993)
(describing Washington's  sole  appearance  before  the Senate  concerning  a  treaty un-
der negotiation  and  how  the  resulting  confusion  confirmed  that such  consultations
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Fourth,  the  requirement  of acquiescence  has  a special  meaning
and  theoretical  significance.  By acquiescence,  we  will again  refer  to
the observed practice or behavior of the branches, rather than to their
official  positions.  It is common  that branches  will  give  in or strike a
bargain  that effectively  acquiesces  in the views of another branch, all
the while  disclaiming any surrender of official powers  or intention  to
set a precedent.  Presidents,  for example,  routinely waive claims of ex-
ecutive  privilege, allowing  even  their closest  advisers  to  testify  before
Congress,  while  denying  that  they  have  compromised  their constitu-
tional  prerogatives.30  In our  definition,  such  events  count  as  show-
downs  that have  set  nonjudicial  precedents  in  favor  of the  constitu-
tional power of Congress to require testimony from executive  officials.
Another complication  is that acquiescence  can be total or partial;  one
branch  might clearly cede  to another some,  but not all,  of what the
other branch claims.  This does not affect the analysis, but complicates
the exposition, so we will usually address only the limiting case.
The theoretical  motivation  for this behavioral  definition of acqui-
escence  is the following.  We are interested in legal uncertainty in the
American  constitutional  system.  Where  a branch  has  repeatedly  ac-
quiesced in practice  to the views of another branch, the effective  level
of legal uncertainty is low even if the acquiescing branch  has formally
or nominally  adhered  to  its  position.  Actors  will  anticipate  that the
practice  will likely, though not certainly, be repeated if a similar con-
troversy arises.  In such cases legal uncertainty would be reduced even
further if the acquiescing branch had formally knuckled under, abjur-
ing its  previous  constitutional  position;  but that reduction  will  be of
marginal importance,  at least where the behavior has become regular-
ized.  Branches  cannot avoid creating precedents just by using magic
words.  Other actors will  adjust their behavior based  on their best es-
timates of how the branch behaves, notjust on what it says.
Finally, we  will focus on showdowns  between or among  the three
major branches  of the  national  government.  However,  other actors
were impracticable,  though ex post presentation for ratification  fit the requirements of
both the Constitution and political  expediency).
so  Regarding  those  alleged  prerogatives,  see  HAROLD  C.  RELYEA  &  TODD  B.
TATELMAN,  CONG.  RESEARCH  SERV.,  PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS'  TESTIMONY  BEFORE  CON-
GRESSIONAL  COMMITTEES:  AN  OVERVIEW  27  (2007),  available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/crs/RL31351.pdf  ("The range  of executive branch officials  who may appropriately
assert executive privilege  before congressional  committees, and the circumstances  un-
der which  they may do so, remains  unresolved  by the courts  and is a matter that may
be determined  by case-by-case  accommodation  between  the political branches."  (cita-
tions omitted)).
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engage  in showdowns  as well.  There  can  be showdowns  between  po-
litical  parties, as when the majority and minority  parties in the Senate
disagree about the extent to which the minority party can block votes,
put  members  on  committees,  and  influence  procedural  rules.3  A
dramatic  example  of such  a  showdown  occurred  when  members  of
the Texas legislature tried to leave the state in order to prevent a quo-
rum  from  forming  and  the  majority  party  tried  to  have  them  ar-
rested.32  There  can be showdowns  between  sections  of the country:
the  showdown  over  slavery  between  the  North  and  the  South  led to
the  Civil  War.  There  can  be showdowns  between  the  national  gov-
ernment and  the state governments,  as  occurred when Orval  Faubus,
the governor  of Arkansas, refused  to comply with an order of the Su-
preme  Court, and  President Eisenhower  deputized  the Arkansas  Na-
tional Guard.  And showdowns often involve overlapping  political divi-
sions,  as when  a branch  controlled by  one party  reaches  an impasse
with a branch controlled  by another party.  In all cases, agents granted
political  authority by  the Constitution  disagree about the contours  of
their  authority  and  refuse  to back  down  in  the  face  of competing
claims by other agents.
Our  assumption  that  showdowns  can  create  nonjudicial  prece-
dents is related, but not identical,  to the idea that customary practices
are a source of law.  In the theory of international  law, customary law
consists  of  practices-behavioral  regularities-followed  from  an  in-
ternalized  sense  of legal  obligation,  or  opinio juris.  Theorists  of do-
mestic  constitutional  law3  and  foreign  relations  law 4  have  adapted
opinio juris to identify  law that  arises  from  interbranch  interactions,
such  as  the  President's  power to  withdraw  public  land  from private
acquisition"  or to deploy forces abroad  in small-scale  operations, like
the invasion  of Grenada,  without congressional  approval.  6  All these
31  We incorporate  political parties into the analysis in Part Ill.C, infra.
2  See Texas Search  for Democrats Is Ruled Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2003, at A7.
3  See,  e.g.,  Michael J. Glennon,  The  Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers
Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV.  109,  111-12  (1984)  (analyzing the role of custom as "an extratex-
tual source of authority" in resolving disputes concerning  the separation of powers).
See  Spiro,  supra note  21,  at  1340  (proposing  that,  in  the  law  of war  powers,
"[c]ustom  dominates in place of text").
35 See United States v. Midwest Oil  Co.,  236 U.S. 459,  469  (1915)  (upholding the
President's ability to issue such orders as "a long continued practice").  See  also Glen-
non, supra note  33,  at 115-16, for a further discussion of the  role played  by custom  in
the Court's reasoning.
36 See Spiro,  supra note  21,  at 1356  (maintaining that while, when  viewed in isola-
tion, "congressional  acquiescence  in  the  invasion  of Grenada  may have  been  of mid-
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theorists  deploy  the idea as  a criterion for winnowing  law out of the
larger  set  of behavioral  regularities  or  governmental  practices;  the
idea  is that some behavioral  regularities, such  as  the practice  that na-
tions send diplomats to the funerals  of past heads of state, or the prac-
tice  of Supreme  Court justices  attending  the  State  of the  Union  ad-
dress,  are  not  felt  by  the  actors  themselves  to  have  any  legally
obligatory character and thus cannot count as law.
For our  purposes,  however,  opinio juris is  a sufficient  but not  a
necessary  condition  for  showdowns  to  have  precedential  force.  All
that  matters is  that showdowns  create some sort of precedential  con-
straint that enters  into the decisions  of subsequent actors, whether or
not it is decisive  (just asjudicial precedents  might or might not be de-
cisive,  but  are  always  relevant).  One  way  that  positive  precedential
force  might  arise  is  that  actors  internalize  and  take  to  be  legally
obligatory  the practices  of the past, but  there  are  other mechanisms
that  also  give  rise  to  precedential  force,  as  we  have  mentioned.
Precedents  may just be patterns of behavior  that parties recognize  as
providing  focal  points  that  permit  cooperation  or  coordination.
37
Under the civilizing force  of hypocrisy, actors will incur a cost if they
act too  opportunistically  in  disavowing  earlier  positions  whenever  it
suits  their interests,  and this cost will  affect their later decisions.  But
that  does  not  require-indeed  it  implicitly  denies-that  the  actors
have internalized  the earlier practices as legally obligatory.
C.  Authority, Policy, and Public Opinion
Here  we  clarify some  elements  of our definition,  particularly  the
condition  that actors must  disagree  about  the allocation  of constitu-
tional  authority.  Showdowns  occur  when  the  location  of  constitu-
tional authority for making an important policy decision  is ambiguous
or  contested,  and  multiple  political  agents  (branches,  parties,  sec-
tions, governments)  have a strong interest in establishing  that the au-
thority  lies with them.  Although agents often  have  an interest in ne-
gotiating  a  settlement,  asymmetric  information  about  the  interests
and bargaining power of opposing parties will sometimes prevent such
dling significance,"  when "added  to  dozens  of similar  cases spanning  almost  the  full
length  of American  history, it served  to confirm  the President's capacity  to undertake
such incursions without prior legislative  approval").
37  See infra Part I.C.  For the argument that this is indeed the appropriate interpre-
tation  of opinio juris in  international  law,  see JACK  L. GOLDSMITH  & ERIC  A.  POSNER,
THE LIMITS  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAw 23-43  (2005).
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a settlement  from  being  achieved.  The  result  is  a showdown.  Ulti-
mately, however, someone  must yield; this yielding  to or acquiescence
in the  claimed authority of another agent helps clarify  constitutional
lines  of authority,  so  that the  next  time  the  issue  arises,  a  constitu-
tional  impasse can be avoided.  From a normative  standpoint, consti-
tutional showdowns  thus have an important benefit, but they are cer-
tainly  not  costless.  As  long  as  the  showdown  lasts,  the  government
may be paralyzed,  unable  to make important policy  decisions, at least
with respect to the issue under dispute.
1. Preliminaries
We begin by examining a simplified version  of our problem, one
involving just two agents-Congress and the executive.  We assume for
now that each  agent is  a unitary actor with  a specific  set of interests
and capacities.  We also assume that each agent has a slightly different
utility function, one that reflects its separate set of constituents.  If we
take the median voter as a baseline, we  might assume that Congress  is
a bit to the left (or right) of the median voter, while  the President is a
bit to the right  (or left).  We will assume that the two agents are at an
equal  distance  from  the  median,  and  that  the  preferences  of  the
population  are symmetrically distributed, so that the median voter will
be  indifferent  between  whether  the  President  or  Congress  makes  a
particular decision,  assuming that they  have equal information. 3 8  But
we  will  also  assume  that the  President has  better  information  about
some  types  of problems  and  Congress has  better  information  about
other types of problems,  so that, from the median  voter's standpoint,
it  is  best for  the  President  to make  decisions  about  the  first type  of
problem and for Congress to make decisions about the second type of
problem.
38 We do not mean  to  imply  that the expected  policy  choice  will  be  the median
voter's ideal  policy choice;  we  assume  that the optimal  institutional  allocation of au-
thority  minimizes the deviation  from the median  voter's preferences  relative  to other
institutional arrangements.
39 In  setting up  the problem  in  this  way,  we  exclude  the  possibility  that one  or
both agents would prefer not to have authority over a particular issue because the  issue
is highly sensitive and politically dangerous.  Such an assumption underlies some  theo-
ries, such as the theory of the  "regulatory lottery," according  to which  Congress grants
power to agencies in order to avoid  having to make  a politically  sensitive decision.  See
Peter H.  Aranson,  Ernest Gellhorn & Glen  0.  Robinson,  A  Theory of Legislative  Delega-
tion, 68 CORNELL  L. REv.  1, 7  (1982).  We have criticized  this view  in earlier work.  See
Eric  A.  Posner  & Adrian Vermeule,  Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69  U.  CHI.  L.
REv.  1721,  1746-47  (2002).  Because we cannot think of historical  examples where two
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Suppose,  for example,  that the  nation  is  at war  and  the  govern-
ment must decide  whether  to  terminate  the  war soon  or allow  it to
continue.  Congress and the President may agree about what to do, of
course.  But if they disagree, their disagreement may arise from one or
both  of two  sources.  First, Congress and the President  have different
information.  For example,  the President may have better information
about  the  foreign  policy  ramifications  of  a  premature  withdrawal,
while  Congress  has  better  information  about  home-front  morale.
These different  sources of information  lead  the  executive  to believe
that  the war should continue, while Congress  believes the war should
end soon.  Second,  Congress and the President have different  prefer-
ences  because  of electoral  pressures  of their  different  constituents.
Suppose, for example, that the President depends heavily on the con-
tinued support of arms suppliers, while  crucial members of Congress
represent districts  dominated  by war protestors.  Thus, although  the
median voter might want the war to continue for a moderate time, the
President prefers  an  indefinite  extension  while  Congress  prefers  an
immediate termination.
So far, we  have  explained why the President and Congress  might
disagree  about when  to terminate  the war, but mere  policy disagree-
ment does  not  result  in  a  showdown.  Showdowns  arise  only  when
there  is a disagreement about authority.  If Congress believes  that the
President has the sole  authority to terminate  the war, then the Presi-
dent's view will prevail.  Congress may try to pressure or influence him
by offering support for other programs  desired by the President or by
trying to rile up the public, but these activities are part of normal poli-
tics and do not constitute a constitutional  showdown.  Similarly, if the
President  believes  that  Congress  has  the  sole  authority  to terminate
the war, then Congress's  view will  prevail.  This outcome  is  shown in
cell  (3)  in  Table  1.  Similarly,  no  showdown  occurs  when  the  two
branches  agree  both about authority and  policym-for  example,  if the
President  decides  and  Congress  agrees  with  his  decision  (cell  (1)).
The first column represents the domain of normal politics.
branches  have  tried to slough authority over an issue to each other, we think that this
concern  can  be safely ignored.  For the contrary  view, see  Levinson,  supra note 22,  at
937  (arguing  that accretion of powers by  a government  entity is not necessarily a driv-
ing motive).
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Table  1:  Congressional-Presidential Showdowns
Agreement  Disagreement
About Authority  About Authority
Agreement
About Policy  (1)  No Showdown  (2)  Possible  Showdown
Disagreement  (3)  Acquiescence  (4)  Showdown
About Policy
Showdowns  arise  only when  Congress  and  the President  disagree
about who  decides.  Here,  there  are  two  further  possibilities.  First,
Congress and the President disagree about who decides but agree about
the  correct policy  outcome  (cell  (2)).  In these situations,  which  arise
with some frequency, the two branches are often tempted to paper over
their  differences  because  an  immediate  policy  choice  is  not at  stake.
But sometimes  a showdown will occur.  We will discuss this special  case
in Part  II.B.  Second,  Congress  and  the  President disagree  about  the
policy outcome  and about authority  (cell  (4)).  In this case, showdowns
are  likely because  a policy  decision  must be  made,  and if the parties
cannot agree about what it should be, then they cannot avoid resolving
the question of authority.  We focus on this case for now.
2.  Why Showdowns Occur
In our war  example,  Congress  and the  President  disagree  about
when  the war should end and who should  make the decision.  Let us
suppose that they can both make reasonable  constitutional arguments
and  that the judiciary  will  not step  in  to  resolve  the  dispute.  What
happens next?  If each  branch  asserts its power, we  have  a full-blown
constitutional crisis.  No ordinary political or legal means exists for re-
solving the dispute.  Consider how this crisis might play out.  One pos-
sibility  is that Congress  enacts a law declaring the war at an end, and
the  President  directs  the  military  to  disobey  the  law.  The  military
would  need  to  decide  whether  to  obey  the  President  or  Congress.
The military might make  this decision  on the basis of a good-faith  le-
gal analysis, or it might not.  Whether or not it does, there is a further
question of whether soldiers would obey the decisions of the generals
and whether  the  public would  support  the  decisions  of the  soldiers.
The  soldiers  might fear  that if the generals  take  an  unlawful  stance,
the soldiers might subsequently be found guilty of committing crimes.
And  even  if they do not, they might fear  that the public  might fault
them for obeying  (or disobeying)  the generals.  A great deal of delay
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and  paralysis  could result  as  people decide  for  themselves  what they
ought to  do.  But eventually only  two outcomes  are possible.  One is
that the nation divides  into factions and a civil war erupts-a real pos-
sibility  in many  countries,  but one  sufficiently  remote  in the  United
States  today  that we  can  safely  ignore  it.  The other  is  that, through
the mysterious  process by which public  opinion forms,  the public will
throw its weight behind one branch or the other, and the branch that
receives public support will prevail.
We  will  call  the  public's  decision  about  the location  of constitu-
tional  authority "public constitutional sentiment."  The "public" here
does  not necessarily mean  a fair  aggregation  of the views  of all  citi-
zens; it is a stand-in  for the complex  process by which  the views of el-
ites,  interest  groups,  ordinary  citizens,  and  others  ultimately  deter-
mine  the  de  facto  lines  of political  authority-views  that  might  be
mediated,  or  not, by  good-faith  interpretation  of relevant  texts  and
traditions.  Nor  does  "the public"  refer  to an episodic  or superficial
political fancy, such as what can be read off a public opinion poll.  If a
showdown  occurs and  the government  is  paralyzed,  then  the public,
or at least important groups, will rouse themselves  to attention, and so
the  view  that  prevails  will  reflect  more  fundamental,  quasi-
constitutional  instincts than the views that prevail in ordinary politics.
We  will  generally  assume  that public  constitutional  sentiment  is  ex-
ogenous-determined  by social and economic trends and thus not di-
rectly controlled by political agents-but it is possible  that public con-
stitutional  sentiment  is  also  influenced  by  earlier  constitutional
showdowns  and settlements,  given the powerful  role of tradition and
precedent in public thinking.
Public constitutional  sentiment is  the bedrock, but that does not
mean  that it will be profound or even intelligent.  There  is no reason
to believe  that public constitutional sentiment actually reflects the op-
timal allocation of authority:  it may be that public constitutional  sen-
timent is simply uninformed, or is heavily influenced by the private in-
terests of groups or elites.  It might be that social welfare  is maximized
if Congress has the authority to terminate the war, but public constitu-
tional sentiment nonetheless  places that authority with the President.
Our focus  is not on whether public constitutional sentiment is optimal
but what, given that sentiment, is the optimal way for Congress and the
President to  act.  We  will  bracket the possibility that Congress  and the
President may care sufficiently about the public interest to cooperate  in
allocating  powers  and avoid impasses  that would  be resolved by public
constitutional  sentiment, while  still knowing  that public  constitutional
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sentiment is uninformed and bad for the country.  This possibility is not
absurd:  it is reflected in the  views of people who oppose proposals for
constitutional conventions because of the risk that the Constitution that
emerges would be worse than the Constitution  that we have.  However,
if Congress  and the President can maintain  such an allocation of pow-
ers voluntarily, then, by definition, showdowns do  not occur.  Thus, we
can ignore this possibility for purposes of our discussion.
If public  constitutional  sentiment  will  ultimately  settle  the  ques-
tion of whether Congress or the President has the power to terminate
the war,  why  do  showdowns  occur?  One might think  that Congress
and the President will simply resolve their dispute by consulting public
constitutional sentiment.  The alternative  would only be  a  showdown
that would last long enough  to rouse  the public,  and the paralysis  of
government during this interval  could damage both the President and
Congress and ruin the electoral chances of their occupants.
The question is a familiar one in the game theoretic literature  on
bargaining,  and we  adopt that literature's findings.4°  Game  theorists
would treat the problem in the context of a standard bargaining game
between  two agents  over  a pool  of resources  or a  "pie" whose  value
declines  over  time  as  the  agents  haggle.  When  two  agents bargain
over  an  asset,  the  eventual  outcome  is  determined  by  the  parties'
valuations of the asset, their relative bargaining power, and the degree
of information asymmetry.
Generally speaking, the asset will end up in the hands of the party
who values it more.  If a seller owns an asset and a buyer values the as-
set more than the seller does, then a sale will occur and, all else equal,
they  will  split  the  surplus-the  price  will  be  midway  between  the
seller's valuation  and  the  buyer's valuation.  If another  buyer  offers
the seller a price higher than the seller's valuation but lower than the
first buyer's valuation,  then the seller now  has an outside option  that
improves  her bargaining  position  vis-A-vis  the  first buyer, and  hence
the  agreed-upon  price  will  rise.  The price  will also reflect  inside  op-
tions,  such  as  the value  that the  seller  receives  from  using  the  asset
while bargaining proceeds.
Bargaining  power  refers  to  the  relative  time  preferences  of  the
agents.  If bargaining is likely to take a great deal of time and the seller
values  future payoffs  more than the original  buyer does,  the seller will
be able to hold out for a still higher price.  The reason is that the seller
40  See generally ABHINAY MuTHOO,  BARGAINING  THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS  (1999).
We simplify considerably.
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loses less than the buyer as a result of delay caused by  a bargaining im-
passe, and so the buyer will pay a higher price to avoid the delay.
Information  asymmetry  exists  when  one  or both  agents  lack  in-
formation about the valuation of the other.  Information asymmetry is
always  a  matter  of degree.  At one  extreme,  in a  purely  theoretical
world where information  asymmetry  does  not exist, the  agents would
come  to  an agreement  in the  first round  of bargaining because  they
can  only become  worse off from delay.  As the degree of information
asymmetry  increases,  however, agents  might gain an  advantage from
delay.  For example,  suppose  that the seller  does not know whether
the buyer values the asset a great deal or very little.  If a great deal, the
seller would charge a high price; if very little, the seller would charge a
low price.  Not knowing which buyer she faces, the seller might offer a
high price.  The high-value  buyer would  accept the price  in order to
avoid  the cost of delay, while the  low-value  buyer would  hold out an
extra round.  In the second round, the seller knows that only the low-
value buyer would have turned down the initial offer and, accordingly,
lowers  the price.  Thus, in equilibrium, delay and the resulting  loss of
value of the asset occurs with some probability.
The "asset" in our example is the right to determine when the war
will be terminated.  Congress and the President may value this asset to
a  different  degree,  simply  because  the  relevant  officials'  electoral
prospects  depend  to  a different degree  on  the  outcome of the war.
One source  of asymmetric  information, then, arises from  uncertainty
that  each  agent  may  have  about  the  other  agent's  valuation  of the
right.4'  Another source of asymmetric information  arises from uncer-
tainty  about  public  constitutional  sentiment,  and  each  agent  might
have  different  views  about  the  probability  that public  constitutional
sentiment will favor its claim.  If the President announces that he will
refuse  to  obey a statute  that terminates  the war,  even  if the  govern-
ment will collapse, he is making a strong statement that he values the
right to  terminate  the war  a great deal.  This statement  may or may
not  be  credible;  all  of this  depends  on  how  much  Congress  knows
about the President's incentives.  But if the President really does value
the right a great deal, and Congress does not believe him, then a long
time will pass before a resolution is achieved.
It should  be immediately  clear that a showdown  is a matter of de-
gree.  After Congress  passes the law declaring  the end of the war, the
41  The institutions are  aggregations,  of course, which  complicates this argument;
we address this issue in Part III.C, infra.
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executive  branch might engage  in some  tentative actions  designed  to
gauge  public constitutional  sentiment.  It might begin  by expressing
some  reservations  about  Congress's  authority  or  leaking  unofficial
statements of disagreement.  If the public  responds  favorably, the ex-
ecutive  might take a strong stance, and, correlatively, Congress might
back off.  If the public's views are ambiguous, both sides might dig in
their  heels.  In  the  meantime,  the military  might  temporize, hoping
for  a political  resolution.  As  time  passes,  the  fact  of an impasse  will
become clear,  the cost from delay will increase, and an atmosphere of
crisis  may  develop.  At some  point, one  side  or the  other will  back
down, a compromise  will be achieved, or there  will be a breakdown  in
authority, such as civil war.
The agent that prevails  gains  two benefits.  First, its policy view will
prevail.  The war will  or will not be terminated.  Second,  its authority
over  the  policy  domain  will  be  established  in  the  following  sense.
When  the issue arises again  in the future-in some  future war, where
the  President  and  Congress  have  different  views  as  to  the  timing of
withdrawal-the  institution  that made  the  decision  earlier  will  have
presumptive  authority  to  make  the  decision  the  second  time.  The
reason is that the first decision  will establish that public constitutional
sentiment  confers authority  on  that agent.  If the  President prevails
the first time around, then Congress  will  fear that resisting  the Presi-
dent the second time will lead to  defeat yet again.  To be sure, public
constitutional sentiment could shift in the intervening period, but this
is  only a possibility,  and if general  political conditions  do not change
in  the  meantime,  then  it  is  unlikely  that public  constitutional  senti-
ment will either.  Adding to  this, the precedent itself might feed into
and  strengthen  public  constitutional  sentiment,  as  people  generally
give  weight to  tradition and precedent, and  the agent who  resists  the
precedent might be faulted for carelessly provoking a crisis.
4
2
Our picture,  then,  depicts  political  agents  being  tempted  to  ad-
vance their authority at the expense of other agents, while also fearing
that if the  other side does  not back down, a politically damaging  im-
passe  or crisis  could occur.  Such a crisis would hurt both  sides  that
participate in it, weakening  them relative  to other agents  that stay on
42 In  imaginable  cases,  an agent  will  lose  the  policy  battle but win the authority
battle.  For example,  a President might strike  a deal with  Congress  that provides  that
the President will change  policy and Congress will,  by some explicit act, recognize  the
President's authority.  But this is not really  a case of constitutional  change  through  a
showdown;  it  is  a  kind  of incremental  constitutional  evolution  that occurs  through
normal politics.
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the sidelines,  but one side  will emerge  with public constitutional  sen-
timent on  its side  and thus do better  than the other side.  To  avoid
showdowns,  the agents  attempt  to predict public  constitutional  senti-
ment and reach  a bargain, but they sometimes  fail.  Part II  will exam-
ine constitutional  showdowns from the demand side, asking what rate
and distribution  of showdowns  would  be  best from  the standpoint  of
social welfare.  Part III will turn to the supply side, asking whether na-
tional lawmaking  institutions will produce or approximate the optimal
level and distribution of showdowns.  We attempt throughout to state
the conditions under which showdowns are welfare  improving and the
conditions  under  which  decentralized  interaction  among  branches
will or will not produce welfare-improving showdowns.
II.  NORMATIVE  EVALUATION
Often  the  struggle  to  establish  constitutional  authority  overshad-
ows  the decision  itself.  Showdowns  are played for high  stakes, and  if
the benefits  are great, the risks  are great as well.  If both agents  take
an aggressive  stance,  then a showdown  occurs, and rather than estab-
lishing policy  and seeing its choice vindicated,  each  agent finds itself
in a costly and protracted battle to assert its authority.  The delay and
crisis  that result can seriously harm the public interest.  In Part III, we
will discuss how agents'  incentives to make these tradeoffs might cause
a deviation from the socially optimal outcome.  In this Part, we want to
establish what that socially optimal outcome is.
A.  Social Costs and Benefits
In the framework on which we  have been relying, what are the so-
cial  costs and benefits of showdowns?  The benefit is that a showdown
clarifies  constitutional authority,  reducing  decision  costs for the  gov-
ernment and public in the future.  The cost is that a showdown  inter-
rupts  governance.  The  social  desirability  of a  particular  showdown
depends on the balance of this benefit and cost.
Clarification of constitutional authority provides major benefits to
the public.  When public officials  do not know who  has the authority
to  perform  some  action,  they make  inconsistent  decisions  or  fail  to
decide, leaving subordinates uncertain  how to proceed and the public
confused about law and policy.  The public, unable  to predict how the
government  will act, is  likely  to be  excessively  cautious.  Future gen-
erations  and current actors-officials,  citizens,  and  litigants-benefit
from  clarification  of  the  rules  of the  constitutional  game,  all  else
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equal.  Obviously  an  actor  might  prefer  uncertainty  to  clearly  bad
rules,  but only if the uncertainty  creates  a chance  that the  rules  will
eventually be  clarified  in the  actor's  favor.  At any given  level of (ex-
pected) goodness or badness of the rules,  clarity is better than lack of
clarity.  Furthermore,  a risk-averse actor might prefer a clear rule that
is  somewhat unfavorable,  if an ambiguous rule  with  a more favorable
expected outcome carries with it a risk of severe downside loss.  And two
risk-averse  parties  may  both  prefer  a  compromise  that  clearly  gives
them only half a loaf, if there is a chance  that uncertainty will eventu-
ally be resolved by giving the other party the whole loaf.
Uncertainty  is  bad  to  the  extent  that actors  do not like  to  bear
risk, but another  problem  with uncertainty is  that it creates  unneces-
sary  transaction  costs.  In  area  after  area  of constitutional  law,  the
precedents, judicial and nonjudicial, created by earlier showdowns  are
picked  over by commentators  and  the  actors  involved;  but there are
relatively  few precedents,  so  they  leave open  most of the fighting  is-
sues, and the resulting debates  are interminable  and socially fruitless.
The only way for the government to  act when officials  disagree about
their  authority  is  through  constant negotiation  and renegotiation,  so
officials  can  trade  off  favored  areas  of authority  or  find  common
ground  where  one  can  act  without  undermining  the  goals  of the
other.  An early showdown can reduce this costly wheel-spinning in fu-
ture generations.
The cost of a showdown  is  simply that the  government does not
act-or, more  precisely, that the energy of government officials  is di-
verted from the problem at hand to the problem of asserting authority
(in the case of top officials)  or the problem of ascertaining the lines of
authority  (in  the case  of subordinate  officials).  Top officials  stop ar-
guing about  whether  the  war  should  be terminated-a  question  in-
volving difficult judgments about  troop strength,  home-front  morale,
and so forth-and  start arguing about who  should  have the authority
to terminate  the war-a question  involving difficult judgments about
relative  institutional  advantage in conducting  wars.  Subordinate  offi-
cials,  like generals and soldiers, must make predictions about how the
argument between  top officials will  be resolved.  If they guess wrong,
they could  find  themselves  in  trouble  for  disobeying  the  institution
that ends up winning the  showdown,  or, if they temporize, failing  to
be prepared  when  the  decision  is made.  Subordinate  officials might
end  up acting  excessively  cautiously, so  as to  avoid offending  the dif-
ferent authorities, or allowing policy and military judgments to be in-
fluenced by their implications for the resolution  of the conflict about
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authority, to the extent that subordinate  officials have preferences  re-
garding such resolution.  And a  showdown over one issue, like execu-
tive privilege, might metastasize,  as  each  side refuses  to cooperate  in
other policy  dimensions  (appointments,  budgets,  and other areas  of
substantive  legislation)  until the other side backs down with respect to
the original source of dispute.
Closely bound up with  these considerations  is that of timing.  Of-
ten showdowns  should  be  avoided  today  because  they  may  produce
41 future  benefits  that  are  not  as  great  as  they  might  first  appear.
There  are  two  advantages  from  delaying  a  showdown  to  the  future.
First, the particular problem that gives rise to the impasse today might
not recur, or might recur only  with  low probability.  If so,  the  costly
shutdown  of the government  today will turn out to generate  a low ex-
pected benefit in the future.  Second,  a resolution today might be er-
roneous  (as judged  by  the  public  sentiment  of future  generations),
whereas  the  particular  problem  that gives  rise  to the  impasse  today
might be better understood  in the future.  Another set of wars  might
teach  the  public  the advantages  and  disadvantages  of giving  the  ter-
mination  authority  to  the President  or Congress;  if so,  then it might
be  better  to put off establishing  the  rule  until  this  information  has
been obtained.  This scenario  assumes, as always,  that the information
influences  public constitutional sentiment, for a rule once established
might be difficult  to change.  In sum, avoiding a showdown  today has
an option value  equal to the  benefit from  obtaining  additional infor-
mation before making an irreversible or difficult-to-change  settlement
that might be erroneous.
To understand these points, consider two examples.  First, to con-
tinue  with  our  war  example,  let  us  further  assume  that  everyone
agrees  that the  United  States  will  continue  to  enter  new  wars,  rou-
tinely, far into the future.  Second,  consider the Bush/Gore  electoral
dispute, which occurred  because  of an unusual  confluence of factors
that resulted  in  ambiguity  about which  candidate  had won  a  single
state whose electoral votes were decisive for the election.  Imagine that
such an outcome is a once-in-a-century  event.
It seems  clear  that resolving the  question  of war-termination  au-
thority is more important for the future than resolving the question of
who has the authority to declare the victor in  a presidential campaign
43 This is a point about option value.  See AVINASH  K.  DIXIT & ROBERT S.  PINDYCK,
INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY  135-74  (1994)  (outlining formal  methods  of option
valuation).
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that turns on a single state's electoral votes, where the popular vote is
so close that minor voting irregularities  obscure the outcome.  This  is
not because  terminating  wars  is  more important  than  resolving  con-
tested elections.  The importance  of the policy  outcome could be  the
same  as far as we are concerned.  The reason  that resolving the ques-
tion  of war-termination  authority  is  more important  is just  that this
question  will  arise  many  times  in  the  near  future.  Thus, the  short-
term cost of failing  to resolve  that question without delay for the war
today could well be lower than the long-term  benefit of having an an-
swer  ready when  that question  arises repeatedly  over  the next twenty 44
years.  By contrast, the short-term  cost of failing to resolve the election
without delay  today  may well  be higher  than the  long-term  benefit of
failing to resolve similar electoral disputes in the future, simply because
the likelihood of similar electoral disputes  is so small.  The relative  im-
portance of the issue is not a factor, because it appears both on the cost
side of the equation and on the benefit side of the equation.
Another relevant  factor  is how  much  the interests of future gen-
erations  should  be  weighted.  At  one  (implausible)  extreme,  one
might think that the interest of future generations should be ignored,
in which  case showdowns  should always be avoided  because the bene-
fits accrue  only to the future.  A more plausible position is that the in-
terests  of future  generations deserve  the  same weight as  those of the
present, in which  case showdowns will generally have great value.  We
take  no  position  in  this  debate.45   Our  argument  is  only  that  the
greater the proper  weight for the interests  of future generations,  the
greater the value of showdowns today.
In sum,  the  optimal  outcome  can  be  described  in  the  following
way.  Suppose  that an agent  asserts  control  over  a policy area.  An-
other agent should acquiesce  if it believes the first agent does in fact
have  that  authority, rooted  in public  constitutional  sentiment.  If it
does not believe  the first agent has such  authority, then  it should ac-
quiesce only  if it believes  the  long-term  gains  from a  showdown  that
leads  to  a  clarification  of  constitutional  authority  are  less  than  the
short-term costs from delay, including the diversion of government re-
sources  and  the  lost option value  that results from  a premature  and
possibly erroneous  decision  that does not exploit future  information
44 Cutting in  the other direction,  if wars occur more frequently, then  the govern-
ment and the public  can learn  more about them by putting off the showdown.
45 For various  views  on  intergenerational  equity,  see  the  essays  collected  in  DIS-
COUNTING  AND  INTERGENERATIONAL  EQUITY  (Paul  R. Portney &  John  P. Weyant  eds.,
1999).
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or that freezes  authority despite changing circumstances.  Otherwise,
the agent should assert its authority and provoke such a showdown.
This  tradeoff will  work  in favor of causing  constitutional  conflict
when future  payoffs are discounted  only a little, the particular policy
question is likely to recur with high frequency, and little in the way of
new information can be expected to arise in the future.  A counterin-
tuitive implication of this argument is that a well-run government, one
that takes account of the interests of future generations, will find itself
in more constitutional  conflicts  than a poorly run government,  hold-
ing constant the clarity and completeness  of the dejure constitution.
We must also compare  the costs  and benefits of showdowns  with
the costs and benefits  of alternative  means for  clarifying the  constitu-
tional  rules.  Showdowns  are  compressed  dramas  that  occupy  the
foreground,  but in  the background  is  the ordinary slow development
of  the  constitutional  order,  in  which  small  disagreements,  conces-
sions, and adjustments  accumulate  over time to settle the distribution
of powers.  If these incremental processes produce an optimal level of
constitutional  clarity, constitutional  showdowns  might be all  cost and
no benefit, and the optimal number of showdowns might be zero.
However,  there  are some  constitutional  clarifications  that cannot
even  in  principle  be  produced  by  small  steps;  rather,  they  require
sharp  breaks  with  the  past.  The  ultimate  constitutional  showdown,
the Civil War, could not have been replicated  by small steps within the
preexisting constitutional order; the very point was  to settle what that
order would  be.  Likewise,  there  can  be no incremental  analogue  of
the New  Deal  Court-packing  episode,  which was  by  its  nature  a  dis-
crete  attempt  to change  the  very structure  of the  Court all  at once,
rather  than  simply  to influence  its  members'  preferences  through  a
gradual series ofjudicial appointments  over time  (a strategy that Roo-
sevelt also pursued, with far greater success).
This point  is often  made  in the  context of evolutionary  decision
making.  Incremental  steps  are  easier  than  top-down  planning,  but
they can only take one up to a local maximum, which, in any reasona-
46
bly complex  environment,  is  unlikely  to  be  the  global  maximum.
The antebellum  period was  one of incremental  compromises  that led
to  a constitutional  settlement that, at least in  the  eyes  of the  North,
was far below a global maximum that could not be reached through a
further small step.  Other possible examples are  easy to  think of.  The
executive branch  has become powerful through a large  number of in-
46  See, e.g.,  JORGEN W. WEIBULL,  EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY 55-58  (1995).
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cremental steps stretching back two centuries.  These steps have led to
what some  people  believe  is  an  excessive  concentration  of power  in
the hands of the President. 47  Whether this belief is correct or not, this
type of gradual evolution could not have achieved what is arguably the
global  peak of executive power-the  type of parliamentary system en-
joyed  by  the  United Kingdom.  This  type  of change  would  have  re-
quired an abrupt switch to an entirely different system.
Furthermore,  even  where  incremental  processes  are  a  possible
substitute  for  showdowns,  and  even  where  the  two  mechanisms  pro-
duce  the same  eventual  level of constitutional  clarity, they have  a dif-
ferent cost-benefit mix.  Incremental  processes reduce the direct costs
of conflict in  the  current period-no  large-scale  political  battles  are
required-and  allow a mid-course correction  if circumstances  change
or new information  emerges, but they also stretch  out low-level con-
flict over  time,  with higher  interim  uncertainty.  The  same variables
we have  mentioned  determine  the conditions under which one proc-
ess or the other will prove superior:  where a clarifying conflict in the
current period would be very costly and might produce an erroneous
outcome,  where  the  costs of interim  uncertainty  are low,  and where
the benefits  of keeping  options  open over  time  are  high, incremental
processes  should  be  preferred,  but  not if conditions  are  the  reverse.
Sometimes  one  set  of conditions  will  hold, sometimes  the  other.  In
general, there is  no reason  to  think that incremental  processes  will  al-
ways be superior, or that the optimal level of showdowns is indeed zero.
B.  The Problem of Ambiguous Acquiescence
In many  historical  cases,  Congress and the President agree  about
the policy outcome but disagree  about lines  of authority.  For exam-
ple, suppose that the executive  branch has made  a controversial  deci-
sion, and  a suspicious  Congress wants  the  relevant  executive  officials
to testify about their role in that decision.  The President believes that
Congress has no right to compel  the officials  to  testify, whereas  Con-
gress believes that it has such a right.  However, the President, in fact,
does not mind if the officials  testify because  he believes that their tes-
timony will  reveal  that the  decision  was  made  in good faith  and for
good reasons.
47  See,  e.g.,  LOUIS  HENKIN,  FOREIGN AFFAIRS  AND  THE CONSTITUTION  37-65  (1972)
(discussing  the expansion  of presidential  power  through  the  lens  of  relations  with
other nations).
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The President's  problem is that, if he allows  the officials to  testify,
Congress  and the public might interpret his  acquiescence  as  recogni-
tion that Congress has the power to force executive  officials  to testify.
If he refuses to allow the officials to testify, then he preserves his claim
of executive  privilege but loses the opportunity to  show that the deci-
sion was made in good faith.  In addition,  he risks  provoking a consti-
tutional impasse in which  Congress could eventually prevail-if, as we
have  discussed,  public constitutional sentiment turns out to reject ex-
ecutive  privilege  in  these  circumstances.  Congress  faces  similar  di-
lemmas,  for example,  when it approves  of officials nominated  by the
President for an agency or commission  but wants  to assert the  power
in general to impose restrictions on appointments.
Political  agents have long relied on a middle  way to avoid  the  two
extremes of acquiescence, on the one hand, and impasse, on the other.
They acquiesce in the decision made  by the other agent while claiming
that  their  acquiescence  does  not establish  a  precedent.  Or,  equiva-
lently, they argue that their acquiescence  was  a matter of comity rather
than submission  to authority.  Are such claims credible?  Can one avoid
the precedential  effect of an action by declaring  that it does not estab-
lish a precedent-in effect, engaging in "ambiguous acquiescence"?
The answer  to this question is affirmative as long as the alternative
explanation  for the action is in fact credible.  If, for example,  observ-
ers agree  that the President benefits from  the  testimony  of executive
officials,  then  his  acquiescence  to  a congressional  subpoena  has  two
equally  plausible explanations:  that he  independently  benefits from
the testimony, or that he believes  that public constitutional sentiment
rejects  executive  privilege.  The  response  is  thus  ambiguous,  and
Congress  may be no wiser about what will happen in the future when
the President does not wish  to permit  officials to  testify because their
testimony would  harm him or executive  branch processes.  If so,  the
ambiguous  nature  of the  action does  not establish  a focal  point that
avoids an impasse in the future.
On  the other hand, if the President's claim  that he benefits from
the testimony is obviously  false,  then his authority will  be accordingly
diminished.  This  is  why  ambiguous  acquiescence  is  not a  credible
strategy  when  the  President and  Congress  disagree  about  the  policy
outcome.  If the President thinks  the war should  continue, Congress
thinks the war  should end, and  the President acquiesces  to  a statute
that terminates the war, then he can hardly argue that he is acting out
of comity.  He could  only be acting because  he  lacks power.  But an
agent can  lack authority in more complicated  settings  where no seri-
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ous policy conflict exists.  If the President makes officials available for
testimony  every time  Congress  asks for such  testimony, and if the tes-
timony  usually or always  damages the  President, then  his claim  to  be
acting  out of comity  rather than lack  of authority  eventually  loses its
credibility.  Repeated  ambiguous acquiescence  to repeated  claims  over
time will eventually be taken as unambiguous acquiescence and hence a
loss of authority.  For this reason, a President who cares about maintain-
ing his constitutional  powers will need to refuse  to allow  people to  tes-
tify even when testimony would be in his short-term  interest.
From a normative  perspective,  ambiguous acquiescence  reflects a
midway point  between  the  extremes  of showdown  and  acquiescence
and reflects  the same  tradeoff.  As we saw,  agents should  tolerate im-
passe when an issue is of great importance  to the future and the cost
of present delay is relatively  low, and they should avoid impasse in the
opposite  case.  Thus, ambiguous  acquiescence  is  optimal in the mid-
dle case:  when the issue is of moderate importance  to the future  and
the cost of present delay is moderate as well.  It also bears reiterating
that  ambiguous  acquiescence  is  not  always  possible;  when  it  is  not,
then the choice must be acquiescence  or confrontation.
C.  The Analogy to Rules and Standards
Many  arguments  in legal  theory  are  at bottom  arguments  about
rules and standards.  Rules minimize  decision costs because  the deci-
sion maker needs to take account of only a few of the factors that are
relevant to the first-best resolution of the dispute, but by the same to-
ken  they  result  in  predictable  error.  If decision  makers  are highly
competent, standards avoid error because they permit all relevant fac-
tors  to be  considered,  but  they involve  enormous  decision  costs.  If
decision makers are of limited competence,  the larger set of informa-
tion  that the  standard  makes  relevant  can  overload  their  capacities,
perhaps even inducing greater error than under a rule.  The optimal
choice between rules and standards trades off decision and error costs
across contexts.4
Our argument  reflects  a second-order,  temporal  version  of  this
tradeoff.  Constitutional  showdowns  convert  standards  into rules that
in  turn  reduce  decision  costs  for  future  conflicts.  A constitutional
standard  allocates  authority in an  ambiguous fashion  ("the public in-
48  See,  e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE  L.J.
557  (1992)  (weighing factors  in the  choice  between  rules  and standards,  focusing  on
whether it is more efficient to allocate content-formation  costs ex ante or ex post).
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terest" and the like)  that leaves political actors  and the  public  a great
deal of work in hashing out the actual allocation when a dispute over
authority  arises.  Agents can  avoid  establishing  a precedent by agree-
ing early  in  the  process  to  allow  one agent  to  make  the  decision  or
leave  authority  ambiguous  if  the  agents  can  agree  on  a  policy  out-
come.  The standard remains in place, and decision costs are  thrown
onto the  shoulders  of future  agents.  However,  if the agents  instead
assert their  opposing  claims and force  a showdown,  then a rule  may
emerge, one that saves decision costs in the future.
49 The second-order  decision,  whether to convert a standard into a
rule or allow the standard to remain in place, is akin  to a decision to
make  an  investment.  An investment  involves  a cost today,  and a re-
turn in  the future.  The cost of the  showdown  is  the  interruption  of
governance;  the benefit is the reduced uncertainty for the future-the
transformation  of a  standard  into  a rule.  When judges,  legislators,
codifiers,  restatement  drafters,  and  others  come  up  with  rules,  we
tend to congratulate  them for simplifying decision making for future
agents.  When  they maintain standards, we criticize  them for failing to
clarify  the law.  But the law  should not always  be clarified;  much  de-
pends on whether the law in question will govern  many or few actions
in the future.  At  a constitutional  level,  the decision  to have  a clarify-
ing showdown or not reflects a similar calculus.
D.  The Judiciary
So far  we  have  focused  on  Congress  and  the  executive,  for  the
sake  of simplicity.  Constitutional  confrontations  often involve  the ju-
diciary as well,  as in the  examples noted in  the introduction.  Execu-
tivejudiciary  impasses  occur  when  the  executive  refuses  to  comply
with ajudicial order, as when Lincoln rejected Justice Taney's grant of
Merryman's writ  of habeas  corpus.  Congress-judiciary  impasses are
usually  less  dramatic  because  Congress  lacks  executive  power,  and if
the  executive  refuses  to  obey judicial  orders, Congress  can  respond
only  by  confronting the  executive,  rather  than  the judiciary  directly.
Still,  in the background, Congress  can threaten  to deprive  the judici-
49 See Cass  R. Sunstein  & Edna Ullmann-Margalit,  Second-Order  Decisions, 110 ETH-
ICS  5,  7  (1999)  (defining  second-order  decisions as  "decisions about  the appropriate
strategy for reducing the problems associated  with making a first-order decision").
50 ExparteMerryman,  17 F. Cas. 144,  148  (C.C.D. Md.  1861)  (No. 9487)  (declaring
that Lincoln, in suspending habeas corpus, "exercised a power which  he does not pos-
sess under the constitution").
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ary of funds and strip it ofjurisdiction, and this threat could lead to an
impasse if the judiciary attempted  to defy it.
The  academic  literature  on constitutional  conflicts  involving  the
judiciary  has  focused  on  the  "passive  virtues,"  in Alexander  Bickel's
phrase.5'  Bickel believed that the judiciary should exercise  the passive
virtues when the constitutional stakes are high, meaning that the judi-
ciary should dodge the issues by invoking doctrines of abstention and
procedural  doctrines  such  as  standing.  Similarly,  Cass  Sunstein  has
argued  that judges should try to decide  cases on narrow and shallow
grounds  where  possible. 2   If a  dispute  between  the  executive  and
Congress requires  either a decision about the meaning of a statute  or
a decision  about  the  branches'  relative  constitutional  authority,  the
judiciary should, if possible,  decide on the former ground, so that the
constitutional question  is put off; even if forced to decide the constitu-
tional question, judges should  say no more than  necessary to  resolve
the  case  at hand  and  should not engage  in  unnecessarily  ambitious
theorizing.
It is  clear that these scholars  advocate  the  middle way of ambigu-
ous acquiescence  in these cases:  acquiescence, because the court does
not dispute  the constitutional  claims  of the  other branches;  ambigu-
ous, because the court does not adopt their claims either.  Rather, the
largest claims  are left open for  the future.  Constitutional precedents
on  the merits  of those claims are  either nonexistent  (under the  pas-
sive virtues  approach)  or narrow and shallow  (under Sunstein's  mini-
malist approach).
As  we  have  seen,  however,  ambiguous  acquiescence  is  not  always
possible and,  even when  possible,  not always  optimal. 3  Ambiguous ac-
51 BICKEL,  supra note 5, at 111.
52  See generally CASS  R. SUNSTEIN,  ONE CASE  AT A TIME:  JUDICIAL MINIMALISM  ON
THE SUPREME COURT  (1999).
53 To be clear, neither Sunstein nor Bickel argues that courts should always refrain
from  taking  strong  positions.  Sunstein's  decision-cost/error-cost  framework  makes
clear that the choice between  minimalism  (here, ambiguous acquiescence)  and maxi-
malism  (here, a clarifying showdown)  depends on  the short-term  costs and long-term
benefits of each.  Id. at 46-50.  We attempt  to clarify  the social  costs and benefits and
examine  whether  institutions  will supply  the socially  optimal  rate of showdowns.  We
also note  that many of the  virtues of minimalism that Sunstein identifies are confined
to judicial minimalism,  and do not apply to  ambiguous  acquiescence  as between  the
other branches.  To  take just one example,  Sunstein believes  that judicial  minimalism
can,  in some  circumstances,  promote  democracy  by leaving most policy judgments  to
elected officials;  as between  the President  and legislators,  all  of whom are  elected, de-
mocratic  values do not, in a general sense,  favor  either acquiescence or mutual  asser-
tion.  Along this dimension,  the case for judicial minimalism is much stronger than the
20081 10191020  UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA  LA WREVIEW
quiescence  is possible  only when the agent's alternative explanation for
its acquiescence  is credible.  In  the case  of the judiciary,  consider the
use of the standing doctrine  to  avoid resolving  conflicts  between  Con-
gress  and the executive.  If the judiciary repeatedly  uses  the standing
doctrine  in  this way,  and manipulates  it so as  to avoid  resolving  cases
even when the standing doctrine would ordinarily not present a barrier,
then  observers  will  infer that the judiciary  simply is  unwilling to  assert
constitutional  authority over the dispute  at hand.  Over time,  acquies-
cence  will become less  ambiguous and, eventually, unambiguous.  This
is, in fact, what has happened for a wide array of interbranch conflicts.
For example,  the judiciary has refused  to hear on the merits cases
in which members  of Congress  have sought  to prevent the  President
from  sending troops  abroad without complying  with the War Powers
Resolution.  The courts have not held that the War Powers Resolution
is  unconstitutional;  instead, they have  avoided the merits  by invoking
doctrines  of justiciability.
54  So while  the  constitutionality of the War
Powers Resolution remains unresolved, the practical effect of the judi-
ciary's  decisions  is to allow the  President to ignore it.  The judiciary's
acquiescence  was at one time ambiguous  because  the  early cases  left
open  the  possibility  that  the  resolution  would  be  struck down  once
someone  had standing.  As  additional cases  have  been brought, and
the judiciary has continued to find reasons to avoid deciding the mer-
its, this ambiguity has nearly disappeared.
Even when ambiguous acquiescence  is credible, it is not always op-
timal.  As we saw, ambiguous acquiescence  is an optimal  strategy only
in certain circumstances:  namely, when the cost of present delay and
the benefit of future clarity are moderate.  Consider,  as an example, a
case in which the judiciary believes that executive  actions during a war
violate constitutional  rights of citizens but fears  that if it tries  to stop
the executive, the executive will defy it, provoking a constitutional  cri-
sis.  Still,  such  an impasse will  be  desirable  if it is  predictable  that in
the present the cost of delay is  not too high, and in the future the  is-
sue is likely to recur.  This might be more plausible today, where some
argument in favor of the political  branches avoiding showdowns with  each other.  But
cf Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI.  L. REV.  315, 317  (2000)  (suggest-
ing that Congress has superior democratic credentials  to the executive such that courts
concerned  to promote  democracy should require express congressional  resolution of
major issues, especially those touching on constitutional rights).
See  the various  opinions in  Campbell v.  Clinton, 203 F.3d 19,  20-22, 24,  28  (D.C.
Cir. 2000),  denying legislators standing to seek judicial remedy where  political options
were available, albeit unsuccessful,  and in  concurring opinions arguing that the claims
are notjusticiable and moot.
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fear that  the  war  on  terror  will  extend  indefinitely  into  the  future,
than during the  Civil War, when the war seemed like an interruption
of normal  politics.55  So it may not be surprising that courts  are more
willing to challenge  the executive  branch today  than in the past.  We
should interpret this unprecedented  level ofjudicial  activity as reflect-
ing an attempt to plumb public constitutional sentiment, even at some
risk  to the short-term  functioning of the government, since  a clearer
sense  of public  sentiment might  be  necessary  in order  to  support a
long-term constriction of civil liberties.
E.  A Note on Aggrandizement
Some people argue  that uncertainty about the constitutional alloca-
tion  of  powers  deters  aggrandizement,  making  institutions  cautious
about pressing the limits of their power.  They further argue that show-
downs  should  be  discouraged  because  the clarification  of powers  that
occurs  after a showdown  will  have negative  rather  than positive conse-
quences.  Namely,  with  the  uncertainty  eliminated,  institutions  will
press the limits of their power, and the public will suffer as a result.5
6
The argument  is hard to  criticize  because  so many of its  elements
are  poorly  articulated. 5 7  An  institution  that  presses  the  limits  of its
5  We do not actually think this common claim makes sense; it rests on a confusion
between foresight and hindsight.  See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN  VERMEULE, TERROR IN
THE BALANCE:  SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND  THE COURTS 255  (2007)  (recalling theories  that
World War II  might not have  a conventional ending, and drawing analogies to the "na-
tional struggle[s]  to defeat polio, or the Mafia, or the Ku  Klux Klan," in which victory
occurred despite the inability to define victory or date it precisely).
We  have not found a detailed defense of this view; however, it is clearly a part of
legal-academic  folkways.  For brief gestures in this direction,  see JOHN YOO,  THE  POW-
ERS  OF WAR  AND  PEACE:  THE CONSTITUTION AND  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11,  at  11-
12  (2005)  ("In  the area of foreign  affairs,  the Constitution  does not establish  a strict,
legalized process for decision  making.  Instead, it establishes  a flexible system permit-
ting a variety of procedures.  This not only gives the nation more flexibility  in reaching
foreign  affairs decisions, it gives each of the three branches of  government the ability to check the
initiatives of the others in foreign affairs." (emphasis added)); Bruce  Ackerman,  The Emer-
gency Constitution,  113 YALE L.J.  1029,  1042  (2004)  ("During normal  times, the common
law fog allows judges and other legal sages to regale themselves with remarkably astrin-
gent commentaries  on the  use  of emergency  powers,  cautioning  all and sundry  that
they are  unconstitutional  except under the most extreme circumstances.  This creates a
cloud of suspicion and restrains officials who  might  otherwise resort to  emergency  powers too
lightly."  (emphasis added)).
"' For example, the argument seems to assume that the institutions are risk averse.
Risk-neutral  institutions would  not  treat an  ambiguous  rule  as anything but a  point
along a  probability distribution, and would discount the benefits  and costs  of various
courses of action accordingly.  However, when we relax the assumption of personified
branches in Part III, we will see that it is problematic to ascribe risk aversion to an insti-
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power might do well or poorly  for the public, and whether it does de-
pends on  various factors.  We  might  think  that the judiciary  ought to
press the limits of its power  in order to protect civil liberties against a
despotic government, but not to substitute its policy judgment for that
of Congress.  We might think that the executive should press the limits
of its power to counter an existential  threat or a Great Depression, but
not to engage in ordinary law enforcement  activities.  Since institutions
share power, whether one institution should press the limits of its power
depends  to  a great  extent on whether other  institutions are  misusing
their powers.  It is hard  to see  how ambiguity about the contours of au-
thority could be  desirable in the abstract;  its  effect is just to  create un-
certainty  among citizens who  are regulated by the various  institutions.
All else equal, uncertainty is a systemic cost, which can only be justified
on second-best grounds; what those grounds might be is obscure.
Indeed, political  scientists commonly argue  that clear  allocations
of authority  are essential  to  constitutional  stability.  Barry Weingast,
for example,  argues that in stable  constitutional  systems governments
refrain from crossing constitutional boundaries because  they fear that
multiple groups will oppose them if they do so.  In Weingast's model,
a  single  group does  not  have  the  power  to  prevent  government  ex-
cesses,  but if groups coordinate,  then they can, in tandem,  resist the
government."  In the absence  of rules that describe  the limits of gov-
ernment action, the groups lack a focal  point that can provide the ba-
sis for coordination, and the government  can  suppress them  through
a divide  and conquer strategy.59  Governmental  violation of a clear al-
location of power can trigger general resistance because the stipulated
allocation  serves  as  a focal  point for  resistance.6 0  Creeping  aggran-
dizement is more, not less,  likely when  the constitutional allocation  of
powers is ill defined.
tution  such  as  the presidency,  Congress,  or  the judiciary.  The President  might well
believe that risk taking is the best chance for obtaining electoral  returns, and members
of Congress  might have  similar views.  Politicians  are disciplined  by parties,  and party
leaders might believe  that party members best help the party by taking  risks and might
thus be willing to subsidize those who take risks and fail.
See Barry R. Weingast, Self-Enforcing  Constitutions  3  (Nov.  2005)  (unpublished
manuscript),  available at http://polisci.stanford.edu/faculty/documents/weingast-self-
enforcing%20constitutions.pdf;  see alsoJames  D. Fearon, Self-Enforcing  Democracy  13
(Aug.  24,  2006)  (unpublished  manuscript),  available at http://www.stanford.edu/
-jfeason/papers/sedapsaO6.pdf  (applying Weingast's model to elections).
59 Weingast, supra  note 58, at 3-4.
60  Id. at 22.
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In sum, the argument that ambiguous constitutional  norms deter
governments  or  parts  of  government  from  engaging  in  self-
aggrandizing  behavior is implausible.  The argument lacks an account
of the interests and capacities of the relevant agents, and so is hardly
more than a surmise.  At the same time, there are several independent
reasons  for thinking that institutional self-aggrandizement  is deterred
by clear rather than ambiguous rules.
III.  THE SUPPLY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SHOWDOWNS
Given  the social costs and benefits of showdowns,  we have argued,
there is some socially optimal  rate, timing, and scale of showdowns.  It
is hard to  say anything  precise about these factors in the abstract, but
we have sketched the critical variables and the conditions under which
social welfare  is increased or decreased  by showdowns.  In this Part we
turn from the demand side to the supply side, from the social calculus
to the private  calculus  of institutions.  We  use  "private" not in  its  col-
loquial  sense,  but  as  shorthand  for  the  decentralized  decisions  of
branches in  a separation of powers system as opposed to the decisions
of a benevolent social planner.
Even without a precise account of the socially optimal rate, timing,
and  scale  of constitutional  showdowns,  we  can  say  something  about
the supply side.  We will argue that there is no general reason  to think
that the  interaction  of lawmaking  institutions  produces  socially  opti-
mal showdowns.  Section A suggests  that the private calculus  predicta-
bly diverges from  the  social  calculus.  Section  B  denies  that there  is
any invisible-hand  mechanism  that causes  the decentralized  decisions
of institutions  to  approximate  the social optimum.  Section C  relaxes
the assumption that each branch  is a unitary actor, but argues  that re-
laxing the assumption generally has  no effect on our conclusions, and
in some cases may even strengthen them.  We also consider the role of
political parties,  with  the  same  conclusion.  Section  D  provides illus-
trations of the divergence between private and social costs.
A.  The Private  Calculus
Showdowns occur when one branch confronts another over a con-
stitutional  issue.  But when  will such confrontations  occur?  As we dis-
cussed  in  Part  I,  showdowns  occur  when  public  constitutional  senti-
ment  regarding  the  location  of  authority  over  some  policy  area  is
uncertain, and each side believes that if it asserts its own authority, the
other side will blink.
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Game  theory  aficionados  will  draw  the  analogy  to  the  Chicken
Game,  in which  each  player receives  the highest payoff if it confronts
while  the other player avoids, but in which mutual confrontation pro-
duces  the  worst outcome  for both  players.  For a  nonconstitutional
example,  the  government  shutdowns of 1994 and  1995  resembled  a
Chicken Game in which neither Clinton nor Gingrich blinked until it
was  too  late;  for a  constitutional  example,  the  McCardle episode  re-
sembled  a  game  in  which  the  Republican  Congress  drove  straight
while  the Court swerved.  Our version  is  a little  more  complicated,  in-
volving  both asymmetric  information  and a continuum  of choices, for
which  we draw on standard bargaining theory. 6'  For our purposes, pre-
cisely which  model best describes a given interaction  or context is not
the main question; rather, we focus on the payoffs to individual players.
Institutions will decide whether to engage  in showdowns  by com-
paring  the benefits  and costs  to  themselves  of doing so-specifically,
the "private" costs and benefits.  What are the costs and benefits  to in-
stitutions of engaging in showdowns?  Here  again, we  assume that in-
stitutions  can  be  treated  as  having  a  composite  utility  function-a
standard  personifying assumption justified by the fact  that every insti-
tution  has  internal  rules for aggregating  individual  preferences  into
institutional  preferences,  and an assumption  that simplifies  the pres-
entation.  In Part III.C, we relax this assumption and examine cases in
which the interests of the individuals who staff institutions, and of po-
litical parties, diverge from the interests of the institutions themselves.
Both  the benefits  and the  costs depend  on what institutions maxi-
mize.  Plausible maximands  include power in various senses-including
the  scope  of the institution's  legal  authority,  the ability  to  carry out a
preferred  course of action, and the ability  to force  other institutions to
comply with a preferred  course of action; popularity, or diffuse support
among the general  public; and ideological  satisfaction with policy.  Dif-
61  See supra note  40 and accompanying  text.  Other interactions  resemble  a Pris-
oner's  Dilemma, in which each player receives  the highest payoff if it defects  while the
other  cooperates,  and  the  lowest payoff if it cooperates,  while  the other  defects;  the
dominant  strategy for both  is to  defect,  and in  a single-shot  interaction  both  do  so,
even  though both would be better off if they could cooperate.  On the other hand, co-
operation  can be sustained in a repeat-play Prisoner's Dilemma, although it is only one
possible equilibrium.  Still other interactions  resemble a Battle of the Sexes,  in which
both players  prefer to coordinate on a common venture, yet each prefers that both  coor-
dinate  on a different common venture.  These  models of interaction  are all at least par-
tially  conflictual,  although  they  mix cooperation  and conflict.  In  the  background  are
many interactions  in which branches  have joint interests  in cooperation  without signifi-
cant distributive  conflicts.  However, pure coordination  interactions are not  as theoreti-
cally interesting as (partially) conflictual interactions, so we will focus on the latter.
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ferent  institutions  pursue  different  aims,  with  different  weightings,  at
different times.  Benefits thus arise when a showdown  expands an insti-
tution's  power  (somehow  defined),  increases  its  popularity  or  public
standing, or enables it to satisfy programmatic and policy goals.  Costs
are the flip side of benefits:  a showdown  might diminish institutional
power, erode popularity, or frustrate policy aims.
Of course,  there  are  severe  conceptual  and  empirical  difficulties
in specifying these  costs and benefits more concretely.  Happily, for
our purposes  we  need  not offer a precise  specification  of all  private
costs and  benefits  to  institutions.  Even without such  a specification,
we  can  ask whether institutional  decisions take into account all social
costs and benefits.  The answer  is no, even  or especially if the players
manage  to cooperate  in  a repeated  Prisoner's  Dilemma,  or to  avoid
disastrous crashes in a Chicken  Game, and so on.  In general,  the de-
cision  by  any  particular  branch  to  confront  another  branch  over  a
constitutional  question,  or to  avoid another's  confrontation,  will  not
take into account all the social costs and benefits of showdowns.  Con-
sider  the  following externalities-costs  to third  parties,  including fu-
ture generations, that the players will systematically tend to ignore.
1.  Governance Costs
Actors incur at least some of the costs of the showdown.  If Congress
and  the President  seek  to  resolve  the  war in America's  interests,  and
disagree only on whether termination should be sooner or later, then a
showdown  might indeed interfere with  their overlapping  goals.  If the
two  agents are  arguing  about lines  of authority,  they are  not arguing
about the  war, which  means  that  they  lose  a valuable  opportunity  to
generate information and reach a mutually acceptable war strategy.
Suppose  that  Congress  and  the  President  agree  that  the  war
should  end  in  four  months,  but  the  President  thinks  that  a  token
force  of 10,000  should  stay  behind  and  Congress  believes  that only
2000 should stay behind.  Suppose further that a showdown delays  the
eventual  compromise of 6000  so that the original force remains for six
rather  than  four months.  Both  sides  are hurt by  the  showdown  be-
cause  both  preferred  the  early  disengagement.  The  cost  could  be
ideological or electoral or both.
62 See generally Levinson,  supra note  22  (discussing the aims of institutions and the
personnel  who occupy them).
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The problem is that neither side fully internalizes  the costs.  If the
war goes on too long because  the agents are arguing, the public might
be in no position to sanction the agents.  If it punishes the Republican
President at the polls, it benefits the Democratic Congress; if it punishes
the Democratic Congress,  it benefits the Republican  President.  Agents
will have excessive  incentives to engage in showdowns,  all else equal.
On the other hand, electoral  incentives might operate in a differ-
ent fashion.  Suppose  that agents  believe  that the public will  punish
incumbents  if governance  is  interrupted,  and  vote  in favor  of chal-
lengers.  To  avoid  this  threat  to their offices,  elected  officials  might
implicitly agree  to  avoid showdowns  even  when  they are, in  the long
term,  socially beneficial.  In our example,  the two-month  delay might
be  a cost-justified  way to  clarify who decides  how  to  terminate  a  war.
But the agents avoid the delay because the actual governance  costs are
exaggerated in their private calculus.
2.  Certainty
Actors avoid  confrontation when it is privately beneficial  to do  so,
even  if conflict  would  create  precedents  that  would  benefit  future
generations,  all  else equal,  by clarifying the rules of the game.  More
conflict now  can mean  lower transaction  costs for several future  gen-
erations; even with discounting, the latter benefit can exceed  the for-
mer cost.  In the recent controversy over  the firing of U.S. Attorneys,
for  example,  commentators  parsed  the  complex  issues  of executive
privilege with reference  to one major Supreme Court case that is over
thirty years  old  and  a  few  successor  cases  from  the  D.C.  Circuit. 64
There  is  also  some  guidance  from  nonjudicial  precedents;  consider
the argument that Secretary  of State Condoleezza Rice  has no consti-
tutional basis for refusing to testify before Congress about the decision
to invade Iraq, because Cabinet officials from previous administrations
testified  in similar  circumstances. 65  Still, such precedents  are slightly
muddled  by  the fact that  the executive  and  legislators  often  strike  a
bargain  whereby  executive  officials  will  testify,  but will  proclaim  that
63  United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
64  See,  e.g.,  Senate Select Comm. on Presidential  Campaign Activities v.  Nixon, 498
F.2d  725  (D.C.  Cir.  1974).  For an  overview  of executive  privilege,  explaining  the
many severe  uncertainties  in this area of law, see  Posting of Cass R. Sunstein  to  the
University  of  Chicago  Law  School  Faculty  Blog,  Executive  Privilege:  A  Primer,
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2OO7/O3/executive-privi.html#more  (Mar.
26, 2007,  11:38 CST)  (summarizing executive  privilege in eight points).
65 Frank Rich, Is Condi  Hiding  the Smoking Gun?, N.Y. TIMES,  May 6, 2007, § 4, at 15.
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they are doing so "voluntarily," rather  than because Congress has con-
stitutional  power  to  force  them  to  do  so.  More  seriously,  in  many
cases  early  bargains  will  head  off a  nascent  conflict,  resulting  in  no
precedent at all.
In general, current actors  may  have  no incentive  to  take  into ac-
count clarification  benefits for third parties,  especially for future  gen-
erations.  This  means  that  future  actors  will  incur  transaction  costs
coping  with  longstanding  uncertainties  that  could  have  been  deci-
sively  clarified,  one  way  or  another,  in  a  past  constitutional  show-
down-a showdown  that never occurred  because it was not in the  in-
66 terests of the then-dominant actors to engage in clarifying conflict.
3.  Option Value and Unnecessary Precedents
On  the other hand, future  generations  will  often  benefit from  a
better  precedent  made  later,  with  more  information,  rather  than  a
precedent  made  today, with  less  information.  Delay would  then  be
desirable,  from  the  social  point of view,  if more  information  can  be
collected  in the interim.  A current showdown,  even if it benefits  cur-
rent actors, might create  a premature  precedent, freezing  the  consti-
tutional rules before the relevant considerations are well understood.
Collecting  more information  is especially  likely  to  be useful  in a
static  environment,  but delay  is  often  desirable  in  a changing  envi-
ronment  as  well,  albeit for other reasons.  A current issue  that pro-
vokes severe conflict may simply disappear from the scene  due to eco-
nomic,  technological,  or  political  change.  Where  this  is  so,  social
resources  spent  on an  authoritative  resolution  of the  issue will  be  a
partial or total waste from the standpoint of future generations.
Where  a showdown  sets a precedent that would  have  been better
set later, with  more information, or that need never have been set at
all,  because  the  relevant  issue  soon  disappears  altogether,  we  will
speak of an unnecessary precedent.  Let us define  the precedential  ef-
fect of a  showdown  as  having two  components:  D, the direct prece-
dential  benefit  (the  decision  settles,  for  example,  whether  paper
66 This adapts  a point made by Owen  Fiss about settlement in litigation:  the pri-
vate  calculus of settlement  fails to take into account  the benefits to third parties of cre-
ating  precedents.  See Owen  M.  Fiss,  Comment,  Against Settlement, 93  YALE  L.J.  1073,
1085  (1984).  It is also a staple of the law and economics literature,  though economists
tend  to be less  critical  of settlement.  See,  e.g.,  Landes  & Posner,  supra note  4, at  261
(demonstrating  that precedents  can  act as private,  as well  as  public, goods);  Shavell,
supra note  4, at 112-13  (concluding that settlement is always  socially preferable  to trial
but recognizing the social value of setting precedents).
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money is constitutional)  and  I, the indirect precedential  benefit (the
decision  establishes  whether  "due process"  includes  substantive  fun-
damental  rights6 7).  There  is  a  cost  C of generating  the  precedent,
which includes  both the direct  costs of decision  making and political
conflict  involved  in generating  the  precedent, and also  the  cost that
arises from  deciding the precedent  now rather  than later, with  more
information.
An unnecessary  precedent, then, is simply one where  C > D + I.  If
the value of waiting for more information  is high, or if the showdown
that gives rise to the precedent involves  costly political conflict, then  C
will be high, and it will be better not to create  a precedent now or at
all.  If the precedent directly governs an issue that will soon disappear
and thus lacks significance  to future generations, then D is low; unless
I is especially high, the precedent  is likely to be unnecessary.
This  is the social calculus,  but the private  calculus  diverges.  Cur-
rent actors  will  not take  into  account  these  benefits of delaying  the
formation  of precedents,  and  of pretermitting  conflict  over  ephem-
eral issues.  Just as current actors  will avoid constitutional  showdowns
altogether even  if the  clarification  benefits would  exceed  the private
costs, by the same token  they will  engage in constitutional  showdowns
now, rather than later or not at all, if it is to their advantage  to do so.
These  points emphasize  that, from  a  social point of view  that aggre-
gates  (with  appropriate  discounting)  the  interests  of current and fu-
ture  generations,  one  must consider not  only  the  number  of show-
downs, but their distribution over time, relative to changes in political
and social problems.
4.  Aggrandizement  and the Checking Function
Suppose  we  have  a  theory stating  that a separation  of powers  of
strength  S is  optimal, where  S specifies the  ratio of the power of each
branch of the national government  to the total power of the national
government. 6s  (If one branch has taken  over the whole government,
67 Griswold  v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479  (1965).  Note that the direct precedential
benefit of Griswold was low,  because only a  few other  states banned  the  sale  of contra-
ceptives, but its indirect precedential benefit was  high.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152-53  (1973)  (relying on  Griswold to  conclude  that the "right of privacy..,  is  broad
enough  to  encompass  a  woman's  decision  whether  or  not  to  terminate  her  preg-
nancy").
"' This theory  might be legal,  based on  an account of the constitutional distribu-
tion of power,  or it might instead be rooted in democratic  theory  or political  morality.
For our purposes the source of the theory is irrelevant.
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S = 1 for the victorious  branch and S = 0 for the others; if each of the
three  branches is  of equal  strength,  S = 0.33 for each.  An  S-function
might, for  example, specify  that the  distribution of power should  be
tPresident = 0.5,  Congress  = 0.25, and Supreme  Court = 0.25).  Obvi-
ously  these  are  schematic,  but  are sufficient  to  illustrate  our  simple
point.)  Suppose  also  that one institution-say, the presidency-is  in-
creasing its strength such that its strength exceeds what is specified in
the  social  S-function.  Then  current citizens  and  future  generations
will  benefit from showdowns  that check the  expanding power of that
branch.
However,  current institutions  will  be  too  passive-they  will  chal-
lenge  the expanding  institutions  too rarely,  and with  too little  inten-
sity-because  they  will not capture  the benefits  to future generations
of exercising  the checking function.  The largest harms from an  un-
balanced  government will be likely  to materialize in the medium- and
long-term  future,  beyond  the  time  horizon  of current  institutions.
Suppose,  for discussion's  sake,  that one  thinks  the  current power  of
the  Supreme Court is excessive-that  the Court's  S-factor is  too high.
Then  one  might  regret  the  many  occasions  in  the  past  two  genera-
tions  on which  Congress and the President  have foregone  opportuni-
ties  to  challenge  the  Court's  power-including  the  many  cases  in
which  the  Court employed  creative  or  disingenuous  statutory  inter-
pretation  to protect its own jurisdiction, and the nonjudicial branches
then  refused to force  a constitutional  showdown  by clarifying the un-
derlying statutes.
The point that current checking  will fail  to  internalize  the inter-
ests  of future  generations  would  hold  even  if  there  were  only  two
branches in the picture.  With three  branches,  however, externalities
among  current  actors  are  also  possible.  One  possibility  is  that  the
strongest branch-the one with the highest S-value-can  play a divide-
and-conquer game, alternating alliances with  the weaker branches un-
til it effectively dominates  both.  Here,  the externality  is that each  of
the  weaker  branches  fails  to  take  into  account  the  full  costs  of  its
short-run  opportunism  to  the other weak branch  and to  the  balance
of the whole system.  Conversely, the weaker branches  will be tempted
to  free-ride  on  each  other's  investment  in  checking  the  strongest
branch,  so  long as  there  is a  positive  cost to  a showdown  that checks
aggrandizement.  A  configuration  (President  = 0.5,  Congress  = 0.5,
Supreme  Court  =  0)  might  yield  far  more  aggressive  checking  of
presidential  expansion  than would  a configuration  such as  {President
= 0.5,  Congress  = 0.25,  Supreme  Court = 0.25).  In  the latter scenario
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Congress  and  the  Court  will  face  temptations  to mutual  free-riding,
while  in  the  former  scenario  the  concentration  of nonpresidential
power  in  a  single  place  reduces  the  scope  for  presidential  aggran-
dizement. 69
Obviously, many other scenarios are possible.  We  have  assumed,
for example, that showdowns  will help  to check aggrandizement, but
this is not obviously true.  Showdowns  might actually provide the very
opportunity  the stronger branch has been seeking  to crush its  adver-
saries or to clarify their impotence,  creating a highly visible precedent
that will underscore  its  power.  We  mention these  scenarios just to il-
lustrate  the  types  of externalities,  even  with  the current  generation,
that can cause insufficient investments even in showdowns that would
check aggrandizement if they occurred.  The divergence between pri-
vate and social costs and benefits  will cause suboptimal checking, and
there is no reason to think the failure of institutions to invest in  show-
downs  that  would  promote  optimal  checking  is  somehow  offset  by
their private-regarding  incentive  to invest in showdowns that will pro-
mote  their  own  power.  There  is  no  invisible-hand  mechanism  that
causes  one type of failure to offset the other-a point to which  we re-
turn below.
5.  A Note on Representation-of the Present and the Future
Particular political mechanisms  may cause some of these external-
ities  to be internalized.  Thus the interests  of current citizens and liti-
gants will be partly taken into account by the more-or-less  representa-
tive national institutions and the presidency and Congress,  although a
large body of literature in public  choice and political economy  details
agency slack  and other failures  of representation  that affect these in-
stitutions.  The  courts  are  less  directly  representative;  although  they
tend to follow the national election returns eventually, they do so only
with a time  lag, and are used by outgoing political parties to entrench
their preferences against the incoming political tide.7°
69  Potentially  offsetting  the  free-rider  problem  is  the  multiplicity  of  checking
agents, which  may raise  the likelihood  that at least one of them  will  step forward  to
challenge an expansion of power.  However, as we discuss shortly,  there is no  general
mechanism ensuring that one effect precisely compensates for the other.
70 See Jack  M.  Balkin  & Sanford  Levinson,  Understanding  the Constitutional Revolu-
tion, 87  VA. L.  REV.  1045,  1066-83  (2001)  (observing that partisan  entrenchment is  the
"temporal extension of partisan representation");  Howard Gillman,  How Political  Parties
Can  Use  the Courts To Advance  Their Agendas:  Federal Courts in the United States,  1875-
1891, 96 AM. POL.  Scl. REV.  511,  515-21  (2002)  (concluding that the increased power
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However,  current politics will  not generally internalize  the inter-
ests of future generations as such.  Current voters will themselves care
about future generations,  and  this  altruistic  interest will  then  be  re-
flected  in  the  policies  of current  lawmakers  (putting  aside  agency
slack between  current lawmakers  and current voters).  This intergen-
erational  altruism,  although  real,  is  plausibly  seen  as  a  weak  force,
analogous to international  altruism  through foreign aid, on which de-
veloped  democracies  spend a tiny fraction of their resources.  The fu-
ture is  another country,7
1  which  means that current voters and  their
agents in national lawmaking  institutions will tend to  subordinate  the
interests of the future,just as they do the interests of other nations.
In principle,  agency slack between current voters and current rep-
resentatives might actually offset the weakness of current voters'  altru-
ism  toward  future  generations.  Current  representatives  who  enjoy
loose political constraints might take it into their heads to crusade on
behalf of future generations.  Or, more familiarly, they might use their
political  freedom  to  enrich  themselves,  pursue  current-regarding
rather  than  future-regarding  ideological  enterprises,  and  so  on.  In
general,  there  is  no reason  to think that any configuration  of current
politics, whether low-slack  or high-slack,  will systematically  internalize
future  generations'  interests,  although  it may  look  to  the  future  in
episodic and unpredictable ways.
Our  conclusion  is  not that  the  private  calculus  of the  costs  and
benefits  of engaging  in  a showdown  never  tracks  the  social  calculus,
aggregating the interests of succeeding generations over time.  In par-
ticular cases,  institutions may  happen  to engage  in showdowns  when
that would be desirable from a social perspective, or to avoid confron-
tation  when  that too  would  be  socially  desirable.  The  claim  is  that
there is no general mechanism aligning private institutional incentives
with  the  social  optimum.  Where  institutional  decisions  happen  to
track the  optimum, it is a lucky coincidence;  over a large set of cases,
wide  divergences  will  predictably  occur,  and  the divergences  will  be
strongly biased in favor of the interests of current generations.
and jurisdiction of federal courts  from  1875  to 1891  was  a result of Republican  efforts
to entrench economic nationalism).
71  Eric A. Posner, Agencies Should Ignore Distant-Future  Generations, 74 U. C-i.  L.  REV.
139,  142  (2007)  (asserting that agencies  treat future  generations  as  they  do the  well-
being of foreigners, about whom voters care little).
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B.  An Invisible Hand?
So far, we  have suggested that there  is no general  reason  to think
that the  decentralized  decisions  of lawmaking  branches  and  institu-
tions will result in socially optimal  showdowns.  It might be  suggested
that  decentralized  decisions  might  result  in  socially  optimal  show-
downs by some sort of invisible-hand mechanism.  Even if each institu-
tion considers only its private costs and benefits, rather than the social
costs  and  benefits,  perhaps  a  kind  of analogy  to  markets  operates,
such that the social optimum arises as "the result of human action, but
not the execution  of any human design."
7   For similar or related sug-
gestions, consider the claims that the "fog" of legal uncertainty in con-
stitutional  law  has  the  systemically  beneficial  effect  of deterring  ag-
grandizement,73  or the suggestion  that "[t] he governmental order that
arises in our  system  of separation of powers paradoxically has much in
common with  the more spontaneous order that may arise where indi-
viduals work out mutually advantageous  arrangements without the aid
of a  central  coordinator."74  The  basic form  of the  argument  is  that
emergent constitutional norms, customs, conventions,  and precedents
are or may  be systemically  optimal,  even  if no actor aims  to  promote
an optimal system.
Of course this is possible, but there is no reason to think that it ac-
tually  is so.  In general, these are methodologically suspect functional
explanations;75  they  speculate  that  private  decisions  produce  social
benefits without specifying how exactly this occurs.  For a genuine  in-
visible-hand  process  to operate,  there  must be some mechanism  that
explains the connection between individual-level  behavior and the sys-
temic  optimum.16  Absent intentional  optimizing  by a social planner,
the social optimum will be produced only by some sort of evolutionary
or feedback mechanism.
72  ADAM  FERGUSON,  AN  ESSAY ON  THE  HISTORY OF  CIVIL SOCIETY  119  (Fania Oz-
Salzberger ed., Cambridge  Univ. Press 1995)  (1767).
7S  Ackerman,  supra note 56, at 1042.
74 McGinnis, supra note 9, at 303.
75  SeeJON ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL  BEHAVIOR:  MORE NUTS AND BOLTS  FOR THE
SOCIAL  SCIENCES  5  (2007)  (identifying  functional  explanations  as those  that explain
behavioral  patterns by describing their consequences and not their causes).
76 See Edna  Ullmann-Margalit,  Invisible-Hand Explanations, 39  SYNTHESE  263,  267
(1978)  (arguing  that the  success of an invisible-hand  explanation  depends on  the na-
ture  of the mechanism  that "aggregates  the dispersed individual  actions  into the pat-
terned outcome").
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In ideal markets, there isjust such a mechanism:  the price system,
enforced  by  competition.  Economic  actors  who  are  not  aiming  to
produce  public  benefits  will  do  so  by  rationally  pursuing  their  self-
interested  ends;  doing  so  embeds  information  about supply  and de-
mand  in  prices  and  propagates  that  information  through  the  eco-
nomic  system. 7'  Under  the  idealized  conditions  of textbook welfare
economics,  the price  system  ensures  that all  Pareto-improving  trades
are consummated.  However,  nothing in  the separation  of powers  sys-
tem corresponds  in any robust way to  the role of the price  system  (in
ideal  markets) .
7   There  is  no general  mechanism  ensuring that the
decentralized  decisions of branches  will produce  the optimal  level of
uncertainty,  except possibly  in an  accidental  and  temporary  fashion.
As in the ideal market and some  real markets, the separation  of pow-
ers system has no central director, but it does not follow that the sepa-
ration  of powers  system  displays  "spontaneous  order"  or  that it will
produce  "mutually advantageous  arrangements."  Furthermore,  even
if all such  arrangements  are made,  there is  no guarantee  that the re-
sulting distribution  of political  power will be socially optimal, because
there  are  enduring divergences  between  private  and social costs  and
benefits.
Likewise, there  is no reason  to expect that interaction between na-
tional  lawmaking  institutions  will  tend  to  produce  anything like  effi-
cient  customs or norms.  In  general,  the  most plausible  case  for the
emergence  of efficient  custom  involves  conditions  of symmetry  and
reciprocity,  in  which agents  know  that they will  be  on both  sides  of
similar transactions over time  and thus have an  incentive  to follow the
rule that maximizes  aggregate welfare  for all concerned.  The interac-
tion of lawmaking  institutions is not like this; a custom that recognizes
broad executive  privilege,  for example,  systematically favors the presi-
dency in all future interactions, and will thus predictably be supported
by Presidents  and  opposed  by legislators,  whatever  its  aggregate  wel-
fare effects.
77 F.A. Hayek,  The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON.  REv. 519, 526-27  (1945)
(arguing  that the  price system ought to  be seen  as  a "mechanism  for communicating
information").
78 Gary Becker suggests that interest-group  pressures  on  legislatures produce  effi-
cient legislation.  See Gary S.  Becker,  A  Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups  for
Political  Influence, 98 Q.J.  ECON.  371  (1983).  But even  if this  is true, taken in isolation,
there  is no guarantee  that the outputs of the  whole lawmaking system will  be efficient;
that further thesis requires that the interaction between  the legislature and the nonleg-
islative branches conduce to efficiency.
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C.  Branches, Individuals,  and Parties
In order to  clarify our main  theses, we  have indulged the deliber-
ately artificial assumption that branches of the national government are
personified  rational  actors.  Although this  is a standard  assumption in
constitutional theory, it is of course false.79  The interests of individuals
who fill the branches  will often, perhaps systematically, diverge from the
institutional  interests  of those branches.  Moreover, individual  officials
are members of parties whose interests  cut across those  of institutions.
Does the lack of realism undermine  our conclusions?
Relaxing  the  assumption  of  personification  should  generally
strengthen  our  conclusions,  because  introducing  a  divergence  be-
tween  individual  and institutional  interests,  or party interests and  in-
stitutional  interests, makes  it even  more  unlikely that institutions will
act so as to produce  the socially optimal level and distribution of con-
stitutional  showdowns.  At worst  these  complications  will  be random
with  respect  to our conclusions,  sometimes strengthening  and some-
times weakening them.
1.  Branches and Individuals
Consider,  as  an  example,  the  problem  of  underinvestment  in
showdowns  that would  check  aggrandizement  (here  again  defining
aggrandizement  as any change  that gives  one institution  more power
than specified  in an ideal S-function).  We  saw  two  mechanisms  that
might cause,  for example,  a current Congress to underinvest in show-
downs that would check the expanding powers of the presidency.  The
first is  that the current Congress would not fully internalize  the inter-
est of future generations  in enjoying an optimal  separation of powers
system;  the second  is that Congress might attempt to  free-ride on the
checking function of the Supreme Court  (which might in turn be try-
ing to free-ride on the checking function of Congress).
The divergence  between  the interests of individual legislators  and
the  institutional  interests  of Congress  provides  a  third  mechanism,
quite possibly cumulative of the first two.  David  Hume argued,  in ef-
fect, that lack of coordination  among members of Parliament enabled
79 See Levinson,  supra note  22, at 926-30  (arguing that government  officials do not
operate  to aggrandize the institutions  in which  they work because  they pursue the  in-
terests of their constituents or themselves).
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the Crown  to buy a decisive  bloc of legislative support on the cheap.8 0
Modem commentators  have extended  the point, showing that because
Congress  is a  "they,"  not an  "it,"  and because  it is  a "they"  with many
members,  legislators  face  severe  problems  of collective  action  in orga-
nizing to oppose the executive,  even where  it would be socially optimal
to do so.8'  The internal  multiplicity of Congress increases  the probabil-
ity that Congress as a whole will underinvest in checking  the executive.
Of course,  the same collective  action  problems  that hamper Con-
gress in opposing the executive  might also prevent Congress from  ag-
grandizing  power at  the expense  of the executive  or the  courts,  and
that  result  might itself be  socially  desirable.  Consider  that internal
legislative  disagreement,  preventing  formation  of a  sufficiently  large
coalition, saved Andrew Johnson from  being impeached.  It has been
claimed, plausibly enough,  that a successful impeachment  of  Johnson
would have decisively tilted the American separation of powers  system
in the direction of a quasi-parliamentary form of government."
2
But there  is  no reason  to think that this second  possibility some-
how balances out the first.  There  is no big ledger where the beneficial
effects  of internal  legislative  conflict balance  out  the detrimental  ef-
fects,  and no price-like mechanism  makes the former equal to  the lat-
ter  in any event.  The effects of Congress's collective  action problems
are, at best, a random variable with respect to the socially optimal level
and  distribution  of constitutional  showdowns.  Once  the divergence
between  individual  and  institutional  interests  is  taken  into  account,
there  is even less reason  to think that decentralized  institutional inter-
action  will  have  any  systematic  or  predictable  tendency  to  supply
showdowns in a socially desirable manner.
2.  Branches and Parties
Political parties have been robust forces  in the American  constitu-
tional  system  since  the  early  nineteenth  century,  and  their  interests
are  often  at variance  with  the  interests  of institutions.  Either by vir-
tues  of selection,  incentives,  or  both,  legislators,  executive  officials,
80  See Adrian Vermeule,  Hume's Second-Best Constitutionalism,  70 U.  CHI. L.  REV.  421,
428-29  (2003).
81  See Kenneth A. Shepsle,  Congress Is a "They, "Not  an "It":  Legislative Intent as Oxy-
moron, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON.  239  (1992).
Jon Elster, supra note 28, at 34-35  (citing ARTHUR  M. SCHLESINGER, JR.,  THE IM-
PERIAL  PRESIDENCY  74-75  (1973),  and  DANIEL  WARE,  THE  FROZEN  REPUBLIC:  How
THE CONSTITUTION  IS  PARALYZING DEMOCRACY  (1996)).
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and judges identify with  partisan  positions.  The consequence  is  that
the separation of powers system functions  differently in times  of uni-
fied or divided  government:  under unified government,  parties may
effectively  reallocate  constitutional  authority  among  the  branches  of
government;  under  divided  government,  parties  will  cause  interinsti-
tutional  conflict and may provoke  showdowns,  but only to  the extent
that partisan interests warrant.
8 3
However, it goes too far to claim that the American  constitutional
system  displays "separation of parties, not powers";
8 4 rather, it displays
both  separation  of powers  and parties  in  a complicated  interaction.
Sometimes  partisan interests  come to the fore  and trump the  institu-
tional interests of branches.s5  On the other hand, sometimes partisan
interests are themselves  secondary.  In one standard  case, parties  are
internally fractured.  The post-9/11  legislation proposed  by the Bush
administration  faced  opposition  from  both  civil-libertarian  Republi-
cans  and  civil-libertarian  Democrats;  the  resulting  coalition  had
enough clout to  narrow the  grant of new  powers to the  executive  in
the USA  PATRIOT  Act.
86  In  that statute,  sunset provisions  were  in-
cluded at the behest of the Republican  leadership of the  House, over
the administration's opposition.
In  those  cases  the  issue-the  point  at  which  the  security-liberty
tradeoff should be  struck-was single dimensional, but legislators  did
not line up neatly by party along the single dimension.  In other cases,
parties  are fractured  because  issues are multidimensional.  Famously,
the enactment of civil rights statutes in the later 1950s and early 1960s,
culminating in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was greatly complicated by
the fact  that geography  and  other affiliations  cut  across  partisan  af-
filiation;  southern Democrats who used the filibuster to strangle early
civil rights proposals were  eventually defeated  by a coalition  of north-
erners and westerners from both political parties.
Finally, in yet other cases, parties are internally cohesive and take
opposing positions, but crucial  individuals place institutional  interests
83  DarylJ.  Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation  of Parties,  Not Powers, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 2311,  2338-47 (2006).
84  See id.
85  For cases demonstrating this, see  id.
86  See 1 BERNARD  D. REAMS,JR.  & CHRISTOPHER T.  ANGLIM,  USA PATRIOT  ACT:  A
LEGISLATIVE  HISTORY OF THE UNITING AND  STRENGTHENING OF AMERICA  BY PROVIDING
APPROPRIATE  TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT  AND OBSTRUCT  TERRORISM  ACT,  PUBLIC
LAW No. 107-56 (2001), at xlvi-xlvii  (2002)  (describing a coalition of civil libertarians of
both  parties that objected to some of the administration's  initial proposals, which were
never adopted).
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above  partisan  ones.  Arlen  Specter, John  Warner,  and Lindsey  Gra-
ham, powerful Senate Republicans,  have opposed the Bush administra-
tion on a range of national security issues since 9/11, in part in order to
protect  the  Senate's  prerogatives  against  perceived  executive  aggran-
dizement.  During the fight over Roosevelt's court-packing plan, crucial
Democratic  members  of Congress defected  to  the opposition,  in part
because  of concerns  about executive  tyranny-a  concern  that was  fu-
eled by the very size of Roosevelt's partisan majority in Congress.87
The  mechanisms  that  cause  partisan  interests  to  trump,  or  be
trumped  by,  institutional  interests  are  manifold  and  highly  contex-
tual.8  For  our  purposes,  the  only  necessary  point  is  that  constitu-
tional showdowns  occur under unified as well  as divided government.
In  the  Youngstown  case,89  which  clarified  the  limits  of  presidential
power,  the Democratic  party held  the presidency,  large majorities  in
Congress,  and  a large  majority  on  the  Supreme  Court.  A constitu-
tional  showdown  occurred  nonetheless,  out of a  mix of institutional
conflicts  and personal animosities among the main actors.  As  Youngs-
town illustrates,  showdowns  under  unified  government  may  be purer
cases  than under divided government:  common  partisan affiliation en-
sures, or is at least correlated with,  common policy preferences, so  the
only dispute  is over the allocation of authority (as in cell  (2),  in Table  1
above).
Overall,  it is  unclear  whether showdowns  are  more or less  likely
under unified  or divided government, or whether they  have the same
characteristics  when  they  do occur under  either  political  condition.
The most that can  be  said is  that while partisan  animosity in divided
government  adds  some  uncertain  probability  of  conflict  between
branches, the tendency under unified government to commonality  of
preferences  across branches  clarifies  that showdowns  are indeed over
authority,  not policy.  If fewer  showdowns  occur under  unified  gov-
ernment,  the ones that do occur are thus more consequential  for the
allocation of powers.
One  might speculate  that because  political parties  know that they
will,  roughly,  alternate  control  of the  various  lawmaking  institutions,
something like the symmetry of interests needed for the emergence  of
87  Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1161-66.
88  For  some  suggestions  about  mechanisms  that  cause  individuals  to  internalize
the interests of institutions, see Jon  Elster,  The Role of Institutional  Interest in East Euro-
pean Constitution-Making,  E. EUR. CONsT. REV.,  Winter 1996, at 63.
89  Youngstown  Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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efficient  customs  is present.  The party temporarily  in control  of the
presidency  knows  that  strengthening  the  presidency  to  excess  today
will  harm  the party's  interests when  it controls  (only) the  legislature
tomorrow.  However, this hardly guarantees  the emergence  of efficient
customs or norms.  Because the system  is a complicated and contingent
mix of separated  parties and separated  powers, parties lack the full  ca-
pacity to  produce  welfare-maximizing  customs  even  if they would wish
to do  so.  Partisan  interests  will regularly-but unpredictably-be  sub-
ordinated  to institutional  and personal interests,  and this will  hamper
the partisan cooperation needed to produce efficient customs  (even as-
suming that the necessary symmetry of partisan interests obtains).
D.  Illustrations
Given  this  analysis  of the  divergence  between  private  and  social
costs  and benefits,  we  should  expect to find that the following condi-
tions characterize  structural  constitutional law:  First, there  is a great
deal of uncertainty about the  allocation of powers across institutions,
because current institutions do not fully internalize  the social benefits
of creating  clarifying precedents  through showdowns.  Second, where
clear precedents are set, they are at least sometimes premature or un-
necessary, because  institutions  engage in showdowns  even if it would
be socially optimal  to set the precedent later, with more information,
or not  at all,  because  the  issue  will  not  be  repeated  in  the  future.
Third, where  institutions  engage  in showdowns,  they sometimes  suc-
ceed in setting bad precedents  that undermine the separation of pow-
ers  system  through  aggrandizement--defining  aggrandizement  by
reference to some benchmark of the optimal separation of powers.
There  are,  of course,  pockets  of structural  constitutional  law  in
which none  of these  conditions  hold.  But nothing in the separation
of powers system guarantees  they will not; nothing systematically works
in favor  of optimal precedent-setting.  We do  not provide  a compre-
hensive review, but offer some suggestive  illustrations.
1.  Uncertainty
Descriptively, American  separation  of powers  law  is blanketed  by
the  fog of uncertainty.  In  every  subfield,  major  questions  go  unre-
solved,  generation  after  generation,  because  the  institutions  of  any
given generation  avoid the showdowns that would clarify  the constitu-
tional  allocation.  Consider  some well-known  examples.  It is still  un-
clear whether Congress can preclude judicial  review  of constitutional
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questions  or strip the  Supreme  Court of jurisdiction  in defined  cate-
gories  of  cases,  especially  cases  bearing  on  constitutional  rights.
Broadly  speaking,  the  reason  is  that  the  Court  avoids  the  question
through statutory construction, and Congress does not force the issue.
In  foreign  relations  and  national  security  law,  the  constitutional
allocation of war powers is unsettled to this day in crucial  respects.  Al-
though historical and judicial precedents have settled some controver-
sies-for example,  that  the  President  has  inherent  authority  to  use
military force even  if he is not repelling a sudden attack, and that the
President cannot seize domestic industries necessary to a war effort, at
least not  if Congress  has  impliedly  prohibited  him  from  doing so-
many crucial  questions  remain  unclear.  Topically,  there  are  contro-
versies  about  whether  Congress  may,  by  statute,  prohibit  President
Bush from deploying troops in Iraq, 9° and about whether repeal of the
2003 statute authorizing deployment of troops will force the President
to withdraw.  It is astonishing  to nonlawyers  that there is  no definitive
answer about what legal validity and effect these measures would have.
Here  too,  the  reason  is  that in  generation  after  generation  decisive
clarification is avoided by conflict-averse  institutions.
Nothing in  our discussion  indicates  that this level  of uncertainty  is
higher  than optimal.  However, given  that uncertainty is a cost, all  else
equal,  the  massive  levels  of uncertainty  in structural  constitutional  law
would  have  to  provide  massive  collateral  benefits  to  be  justified-
benefits  that  could  not  be  provided  more  cheaply  through  other
mechanisms.  No one has  convincingly identified  any such benefits, or
explained why high levels of uncertainty are necessary to produce them.
2.  Unnecessary Precedents
Are  there  unnecessary  precedents-again,  defined  as  precedents
whose  costs  of generation  are greater  than  their direct plus  indirect
benefits  in settling  future  controversies-in  structural  constitutional
law?  Consider the  early  controversies  over the  federal  government's
Commerce  Clause  authority to  build and  operate  "internal  improve-
ments,"  or public  goods  involving  infrastructure  and  transportation.
Although  such  improvements  have  not been  controversial  since  the
90  See Exercising Congress's Constitutional Power To  End a  War: Hearing Before  the S.
Comm.  on the Judiciary, I I0th  Cong. (2007)  (statement of DavidJ.  Barron,  Professor of
Law,  Harvard  Law  School),  available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2007/01  /
Barron%20Testimony.pdf  ("In  my judgment, proposals...  to bring the  deployment it-
self to an end through curtailment of funds fall well within [Congress's]  authority.").
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early  to mid-nineteenth  century, the  relevant  legislative  and judicial
precedents  have  shaped the  later  development  of Commerce  Clause
doctrine.9'  This  is  plausibly  a  case  in  which  D, the  direct  value  of
precedent for future generations,  was  low while  I, the  indirect value,
was  high.  Given the  high costs  of the  political conflicts  surrounding
internal improvements  C, perhaps  C was  greater than  D +  . A prob-
lem with  this  example,  however, is  that it is  not clear  that the  disap-
pearance  of the issue was exogenous  to the setting of the precedents:
perhaps  the issue  disappeared  only because  the  federal  government
was found to be authorized to create  the improvements and did so.
For a somewhat less ambiguous example, consider  the Thirteenth
Amendment.  As  David  Strauss  emphasizes,  the  Civil  War,  not  the
Thirteenth Amendment, likely ended  slavery:  "The most that can be
said  for  the  Thirteenth  Amendment  is  that  it hastened  the  end  of
slavery  in a  few border  states  by a  few years."92  This,  then,  is  a case
where  D was  quite  low;  and  I also  seems  low, given  that the Amend-
ment has  not  been  a  major  source  of constitutional  analogies  and
principles  in later  controversies.  What  makes the  example  slightly
ambiguous,  nonetheless,  is  that  the  marginal cost  of producing  the
Amendment, over  and above the  cost of fighting the Civil  War itself,
was itself low as well.
The paucity of really clean examples in this category  suggests a po-
litical mechanism  that may check  the  creation of unnecessary  prece-
dents:  politicians, including judges, will generally be loathe to engage
in genuinely optional showdowns.  Rather, they will focus only on dis-
putes that circumstances  force onto the political  agenda.  (Because of
the private  incentive  to duck even  those disputes,  some  crucial issues
will be left shrouded in uncertainty and punted to the future, even if it
would be socially optimal  to resolve them now.)  If that is so, then de-
partures from optimality are likely to occur in the direction  of too few
91 See generally Adam  S. Grace, From the Lighthouses: How the First Federal  Internal  Im-
provement Projects Created Precedent that Broadened the Commerce Clause, Shrunk the Takings
Clause, and Affected  Early Nineteenth Century Constitutional Debate, 68  ALB.  L.  REV.  97
(2004)  (analyzing the development of federal law regarding infrastructure).
92  David  A. Strauss,  The Irrelevance of Constitutional  Amendments, 114  HARV.  L. REV.
1457,  1480-81  (2001).
93 When  scholars  invoke Thirteenth  Amendment  principles,  the arguments  are
typically dismissed  as  excessively  ingenious.  Compare Akhil  Reed  Amar  &  Daniel Wi-
dawsky,  Child Abuse as Slavery:  A  Thirteenth  Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV.
L.  REV.  1359  (1992)  (analogizing  child abuse  to slavery  and invoking  the Thirteenth
Amendment),  with RICHARD A. POSNER,  OVERCOMING  LAw  211-14  (1995)  (addressing
and dismissing Amar's and Widawsky's Thirteenth Amendment analogy).
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showdowns, but unnecessary showdowns will  not be a major problem;
excessive  uncertainty,  rather  than  premature  or  unnecessary  clarity,
will be the result.
3.  Showdowns and Aggrandizement
It is  difficult  to  give  evidence  that showdowns  can  produce  (not
just  prevent)  aggrandizement,  because  there  is  no  consensus  on  a
normative benchmark.  However, it can  be shown more  narrowly that
relative to a wide range of such benchmarks,  aggrandizing showdowns
occur.  Commentators  who have very different accounts of the optimal
distribution  of powers  across  institutions  have  in common  the  belief
that, relative  to their own  preferred accounts  of the optimal  distribu-
tion of powers, showdowns have produced aggrandizement.  Consider
Robert  Bork's view  that the  Supreme  Court's  power  grew alarmingly
after it largely prevailed  in the  criminal procedure  showdowns of the
1960s,  while  Richard  Epstein  holds  that the  power  of the  President
and Congress  grew alarmingly when they prevailed over the Old Court
in  the constitutional  showdowns  of the late  1930s.  Bork and Epstein
have very different views about the optimal distribution of powers, but
both agree  that the showdowns  to which they point produced  a mald-
istribution of powers relative to their preferred benchmarks.
IV.  IMPLICATIONS
What recommendations  flow from this analysis,  if any?  It is hard
to say anything very crisp in the abstract, because many of the relevant
empirical  and  causal  questions  remain  unsettled.  However,  we  will
highlight  some  possible  counterintuitive  implications  of the  analysis
that hold under  plausible  conditions.  Section A critiques  the passive
virtues, while  Section  B puts  our claims  in the  context of some  stan-
dard controversies  in legal and constitutional  theory.
A.  The Active Virtues?
The  major implication  is that under certain conditions  the  active
virtues, the embrace  of clarifying conflict, should  be preferred  to  the
passive virtues, or the evasion of unnecessary conflict.  The passive vir-
tues, which  we  have  summarized  in Part  II,  encourage  institutions-
especially  courts-to  avoid  unnecessary  constitutional  conflicts.  As
against  the  passive  virtues,  however,  decisive  constitutional  conflicts
and  precedent-setting  showdowns  should  actually  be  encouraged
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where  the value  of waiting for more information is low, where similar
issues will frequently recur  in future generations  (so  that the value of
settling questions  now is  high),  and where  legal  uncertainty  will  im-
pose high  costs in the future.  In  general,  theorists of the passive  vir-
tues focus  to excess on option value and the benefits of avoiding con-
flict,  while  ignoring  the  opportunity  cost  of failures  to  clarify  the
constitutional rules in ways that can avoid more conflict in the future.
The theorists sometimes  talk as though conflict can simply be avoided
altogether.  In  some  domains,  however,  there  is  an  intertemporal
tradeoff:  less institutional conflict  now guarantees  more institutional
conflict  over  time.  Where  aggregate  future  conflict,  even  properly
discounted,  imposes  greater  social  costs  than  present  conflict,  and
present conflict would  avoid future  conflict,  a  showdown  in  the  cur-
rent period would be socially beneficial.
On  this view,  a major  problem with standard accounts  of the  pas-
sive virtues  is  that they tend  to  take  into account  only the  costs  and
benefits  to  the  relevant institution,  usually  the judiciary,  rather than
overall social  costs and benefits.  This  is  usually implicit:  in the judi-
cial  context,  consider Justice  Brandeis's  famous  formulation,  which
summarized  various  legal  techniques  for  avoiding  "unnecessary" con-
stitutional questions and confrontations  as rules the Court has  "devel-
oped[]  for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its juris-
diction.
9 4  The main  thrust of Brandeis's  discussion,  and of some  of
Brandeis's later exegeses,  is that the  Court's institutional position and
prestige benefit by avoiding showdowns.  But, as we have emphasized,
the social costs and benefits of avoiding or engaging in showdowns are
different than the private or institutional costs and benefits.
Theorists  of the  passive  virtues  sometimes  say,  or implicitly  sug-
gest, that what benefits  the  courts  also  benefits  the  overall system  of
separation of powers:  what is good for the Court is good for the coun-
try.  Thus in  the judicial setting, the passive virtues can be defended as
a  device  for  husbanding  the judiciary's  prestige  over  the  long  run,
enabling it to defend individual rights or to enforce the rule of law in
times of great crisis.95  It is  unclear whether  this indirect account  of
social benefits has had much motivating power for the judges, as com-
94  Ashwander  v.  Tenn.  Valley  Auth.,  297  U.S.  288,  346-48  (1936)  (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
95 See GEYH,  supra  note  17, at 224-43  (discussing methods ofjudicial avoidance  and
providing  examples);  cf JESSE  H.  CHOPER, JUDICIAL  REVIEW  AND  THE  NATIONAL  PO-
LITICAL PROCESS  129-70  (1980)  (arguing  that the Supreme Court should preserve  its
institutional  capital by avoiding questions of federalism or separation of powers).
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pared to the short-run benefits to the Court itself of avoiding constitu-
tional  showdowns when  in  a position of weakness,  but let us  suppose
that it has been motivational.  Still, the social benefit of preserving the
Court's long-run prestige  captures  only one side  of the social  ledger.
The  other side  of the  ledger includes  the social  cost of legal  uncer-
tainty and the conflict it breeds  in future periods.
It  is  conceptually  possible  that, even  if the  Court's interests  and
the nation's interests diverge  in some  range of cases, it is nonetheless
good for  the  nation to  have Justices  who  think that what  is good  for
the  Court is  also good for the nation.  The  implicit theory would  be
one  of Madisonian  competition.  Even if the  first-best  is to  have  offi-
cials  in all  institutions who  act for  the  public interest, the  attainable
second-best might be to have officials in all institutions who act for the
interests  of their  institutions,  thus  producing  a  kind  of equilibrium
convergence  on the public interest.
But as we have  argued, Madisonian  "competition"  rests on a false
analogy to markets.  In  the separation of powers system,  there is no in-
visible-hand  mechanism  that  systematically  aligns  the  decentralized
pursuit of institutional interests with  social welfare or the public good,
however those  notions are construed.  It is not that institutional inter-
ests  and  the  nation's  interests  are  systematically  opposed,  any more
than  they  are systematically  aligned.  It is  that whether  they  are op-
posed or  aligned  is  a matter  of circumstance,  differing  across  cases;
there  is no basis  for even a presumption that the overall good will  be
attained  by  institutions  pursuing  their  interests  in  a  decentralized
manner.  A system  of that sort  can  result in  too few showdowns,  too
many showdowns, or the wrong types of showdowns at the wrong time.
Under  certain  conditions,  then-where  the  value  of  setting
precedents  now is especially  high,  because similar  issues will recur in
future  generations  and little  new  information  will  be gained  by  de-
lay-the  active virtues  are superior to  the passive  virtues from the so-
cial  point of view.  We  do not claim  that these  conditions  are more
common  than  the  conditions  under which  the passive  virtues are so-
cially desirable.  All we claim  is that the theorists of the passive virtues
systematically  fail  to consider  the full  range  of social  costs and bene-
fits, and are too sanguine about their conflict-avoiding prescriptions.
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B.  Controversies in Legal Theory
1.  Precedent
One of our themes  is that the resolution  of conflicts over constitu-
tional  authority  establishes  judicial  or  nonjudicial  precedents  that
guide  the conduct of future agents.  There  is a direct analogy  in the
practice  of common  law courts,  which  similarly  resolve disputes  that
establish  precedents  that guide  future  courts  faced  with  similar  dis-
putes.  When courts resolve disputes, they frequently resolve  unsettled
questions  about jurisdiction-which  court has  authority over  the  dis-
pute-and questions about the authority of other government institu-
tions.  Courts  tend  to  respect  earlier  courts'  decisions  about  both
questions even  though  there  is no external force  that could sanction
courts for failing to do so.
Many  scholars have  provided  explanations  for this phenomenon.
Typically,  they rely  on repeated  game ideas, where an agent who  fails
to respect  a  precedent  will  find that its  own  precedents  are  not re-
spected in the future.
96  Our purpose here is  not to apply these ideas
directly to the problem at hand, butjust to point out that our problem
is one  of a general class  that has received  a great deal of attention  in
the  literature.  This  is  the  problem  of how institutions  (or people)
maintain  their respective  roles in  the  absence  of an  external  power
that can sanction them from overstepping the limits of their authority.
Much  constitutional scholarship  assumes  that the judiciary is  this ex-
ternal power,  but, as  should  be clear from our discussion, we  do not
think that courts can  serve  this  role.  Instead,  they are simply one of
several agents that maintain their power in part by limiting their ambi-
tions and in part by challenging other institutions that attempt to  en-
force a limited rather than expansive judicial role.
What we have  called ambiguous acquiescence  also has an analogy
in  the  common  law  practices  of courts.  Sometimes,  courts  decide
cases on alternative grounds, which weakens the precedential effect of
the decision.  In addition,  courts will  often decide  cases without  issu-
ing reasoned  opinions or decide  cases with opinions that are deemed
nonprecedential.  Not all of these strategies have the same effect, but in
general they can be thought of as situations where courts economize  on
decision  costs  and so come  to  outcomes  that  they believe  should pro-
96 See,  e.g.,  Eric Rasmusen,  Judicial  Legitimacy  as a Repeated Game, 10 J.L. ECON.  &
ORG.  63  (1994)  (developing a game-theoretic model ofjudicial legitimacy).
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vide  minimal  guidance for future  courts.  Such  a strategy  is most war-
ranted when  the issues raised by the dispute are unlikely to recur.
2.  Evolving Constitutions and Constitutional Moments
Much  constitutional  law scholarship  concerns  the nature  of con-
stitutional  development  or evolution.  Textualists  and originalists  be-
lieve that the Constitution changes  only through  amendment, but this
view is  best taken as  a normative argument.  Few people dispute  that
the meaning  of the  Constitution  has changed  a great deal  since  the
founding.  Judicial  precedents  provide the  obvious examples, but the
working  out  of  authority  between  the  executive  and  legislative
branches,  and between the national and state governments,  is equally
important, although the documentary record is less clear.
How  does  the  Constitution  change,  as  a  positive  matter,  if the
formal  amendment  procedure  is  not used?  One  view  draws  on the
analogy  to common  law development. Judges  interpret constitutional
provisions  in light of new conditions not anticipated  by the founders,
in doing  so subtly  (and sometimes  not so  subtly)  changing its mean-
ing.  Over time, these interpretations  accrete and yield new allocations
of power.9'  Another view finds constitutional  change  in moments  of
upheaval when the public is supposedly attuned to politics and consti-
tutional issues to a greater extent than in normal times.  The Civil War
and  the  New  Deal  are  cited  as  examples.  The  public  approves  of
changes in higher law, and these changes are duly respected by politi-
cal actors.9s
The implicit picture on which we rely is neither as judge-centered
as  the  first  account  nor  as  episodic  as  the  second:  constitutional
showdowns  occur  regularly,  but  the  most  frequent  and  important
cases occur outside the courts.  We think of constitutional change as a
routine  phenomenon  that political  actors  have  a special  role  in pro-
voking.  Public constitutional sentiment  evolves in subterranean  fash-
ion,  generally  unperceived  by  those  who  exercise  power.  However,
when  political  agents disagree  about the  allocation  of authority,  they
must make predictions about how the public will react if a showdown
occurs.  The  agents  subtly  shift  their  allocation  claims  in  response
97  See David  A. Strauss,  Common Law Constitutional  Interpretation,  63  U. CHI. L. REv.
877, 884-91  (1996)  (describing constitutional change as a common law process).
98 See 2  BRUCE  ACKERMAN,  WE  THE  PEOPLE  3-31  (1998)  (examining  higher  law-
making generally); ACKERMAN,  supra note  4, at 266-69  (considering  higher lawmaking
in the context of the New Deal).
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both to their  predictions  about  public  reaction and  to  the clarifying
effects of showdowns when they actually occur.
We  said that our positive picture of constitutional development is
inconsistent with originalism.  However, it  is plausibly consistent with
(a  suitably  specified  version of)  popular  constitutionalism,  although
the sponginess of the latter approach makes it hard  to be sure.  Some
"popular"  constitutionalists  seem  to  envision  widespread  and  genu-
inely inclusive debate over constitutional meaning,9  while others tend
to  focus  on  political  movements  among  the  educated  and  other el-
ites.'°°  In our approach, the elites who  control the institutions of gov-
ernment  effectively  decide  whether  or  not  to engage  in  precedent-
setting  showdowns,  but  public  constitutional  sentiment-which  may
or may not be very  popular, depending on circumstances-is  both  a
major  political  constraint and  a major variable  in the  elites'  political
calculations.  The  populace  at  large  exercises  an  indirect  influence
over constitutional  development, but as  a filter  that rules out certain
elite  positions  and  as  an  ultimate  court  of appeal,  rather  than  as  a
front-line participant.
3. Judicial Review and Deference
The  positive  claim  that  constitutional  development  occurs
through  precedent-generating  showdowns  and  the  normative  claim
that the judiciary and other institutions will produce  social benefits by
embracing  the  active  virtues  under identifiable  conditions  both  cut
across  standard  controversies  about judicial  review  of legislation  and
executive action  for constitutionality.  Nothing in the idea of a prece-
dent-generating  showdown,  or  in our  prescription for  the  active  vir-
tues, requires aggressive judicial review on the merits; to think so is  to
confuse  legal  certainty or  clarification  with  the  content  of the  legal
rules.  A showdown  that decisively clarifies the power of the  Supreme
Court in a certain domain might produce expansive judicial power, or
instead  a  great  deal  of judicial  deference-perhaps  something  like
James  Bradley Thayer's  rule that courts would  overturn  legislation on
constitutional  grounds  only when  the  legislature  has  made  a  "clear
99  See generally LARRY D.  KRAMER, THE  PEOPLE  THEMSELVES:  POPULAR CONSTITU-
TIONALISM ANDJUDICIAL REVIEW  (2004).
100  See Robert  C.  Post  &  Reva  B.  Siegel,  Protecting the Constitution  from the People:
Juricentric Restrictions  on  Section  Five  Power, 78  IND.  L.J.  1  (2003)  (addressing  the
Rehnquist  Court's assumption  of authority  over  constitutional  questions  that would
otherwise be entrusted to Congress).
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mistake"  about constitutionality."" °  Thus  showdowns  over  social and
economic regulation in the 1930s clarified  that the Court would take a
Thayerian,  highly  deferential  approach  to  review  under  the  Com-
merce  Clause
1 0 2  and  would  essentially  cease  enforcing  the  so-called
"nondelegation  doctrine. "'°'  Bracketing  the  intensity  of judicial  re-
view, which might be low or high on the merits, the positive benefit of
clarification for future generations is the same.
Conversely,  neither  the  passive  virtues  nor minimalism  have  any
necessary connection  to the  intensity  of judicial  review.  The passive
virtues  can  be  used to  avoid backlash  against intrusive  constitutional
decisions and to harbor judicial capital for aggressive judicial review in
a future period,  as when the Warren Court ducked  the inflammatory
issue  of  the  constitutionality  of  antimiscegenation  laws.
0 4   On  the
other hand,  the passive virtues  can  instead be used  as  part of a long-
term practice  that cuts the judiciary  out of certain  questions, leaving
in place  whatever  status  quo arrangements  legislators  and  the  Presi-
dent have  worked out.  An  example  of the latter form  of the passive
virtues,  discussed above,  is  the long-term judicial practice  of ducking
questions  about  the constitutional  allocation  of war powers.  So  too
with minimalism:  narrow and shallow decisions can be deferential  to
government on the merits,  or not deferential.  The issue of deference
is  orthogonal  to  the  question  of  whether  constitutional  decisions
should be minimalist or maximalist.
CONCLUSION
Good  lawyers  advise  their  clients  to  settle  because  litigation  is  a
costly and risky process, and clients frequently  overestimate  the gains
and underestimate  the costs.  But in  the constitutional setting, where
the  choice  is  between  settlement  and  showdown,  rather  than  settle-
ment and trial,  the costs  and benefits  are not the same.  Settlements
avoid diversion of the government's  energy away from the problem at
hand, but the showdown  is  an important engine  of constitutional  de-
101  SeeJames B. Thayer,  The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine  of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV.  L. RE,. 129,  144  (1893)  (arguing that judicial  review should use a "clear
mistake" standard).
102  See NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301  U.S. 1, 49 (1937)  (holding that far-
reaching federal regulation of industry is within Congress's Commerce Clause power).
103  See Lichter v. United  States,  334  U.S.  742,  785  (1948)  (allowing  Congress  to
grant substantial discretion to officials).
104  See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891,  891  (1955)  (refusing to consider  the merits be-
cause of an inadequate  record).
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velopment, and sometimes the only way to realign institutional lines of
authority with  public sentiment is through confrontation.  In the case
of public law, as with some types of public-law litigation, confrontation
benefits third parties and future generations  by clarifying the rules of
the game.  °5  Well-motivated  constitutional  actors  in  the  present  will
take this benefit into account.
1o Cf  Fiss, supra note  66  (discussing the  costs  of settlement  to third  parties  who
are deprived of useful precedents).
[Vol.  156:991